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Abstract 
 
“The Pied Piper in Power:  Ideological Resources and the Authoritarian Youth Group” 
Isaiah Zachary Sterrett 
Advisor:  Professor Gerald Easter  
 
     How do authoritarian states attempt to acquire ideological resources vis-à-vis their youth 
populations?  This thesis demonstrates that one way in which these states attempt to do so is 
by way of an institution I call the authoritarian youth group (AYG).  Examples of AYG treated 
in the paper include the Hitler Jugend in Nazi Germany; the VLKSM or Komsomol in the 
U.S.S.R.; and Nashi (“Ours”) in post-Communist Russia.  Primarily on the basis of 
secondary-source material, I argue that, across cases, governors of authoritarian states create 
and maintain AYG primarily in order to curry ideological resources among young people.  In 
particular, states use AYG principally in order to legitimate the nation-state by espousing 
particular national narratives and lionizing the state; to promote among young people a sense 
of national homogeneity; to propagate particular mores related to gender, family, sex, and 
sexuality; and to affect the formation of a loyal elite for the state’s future.  The paper aims to 
contribute to the comparative-politics subfield by enhancing scholars’ knowledge of 
authoritarian governance, ideological resources in authoritarian contexts, and, most 
importantly, the relationship between the authoritarian state and young people.     
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
      
     In the summer of 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned a California 
law which prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors.  The lopsided majority took 
seriously California’s interest in shielding children from certain aspects of the adult world, 
but decided that the country’s most populous state had gone too far.  The Court rejected the 
video-game law on the grounds that the First Amendment protects the free dissemination 
of—in the Court’s language—“ideas.”  Unlike obscene materials, for which the Constitution 
offers no protection, video games were akin to “books, plays, and movies,” and therefore fell 
within the purview of free speech.  Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the Court, 
was characteristically terse:  “No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children 
from harm…but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which 
children may be exposed.”1   
     The immediate ramifications of the Court’s decision are probably few.  Nevertheless, it 
begs several important questions.  Is it true that the First Amendment prohibits, or at least 
discourages, government from stifling certain “ideas”?  Does the First Amendment also 
prohibit government from promoting certain ideas?  When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the 
United States in the early nineteenth century, he famously discovered that Americans’ 
alacritous democratic impulses were not always accompanied by liberal values.  This might 
have been especially true when it came to “the domain of conscience.”  In his review of the 
first Europeans to settle New England in the early seventeenth century, Tocqueville 
                                                 
1 The Court wrote, in part:  “Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games 
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices…and through features 
distinctive to the medium….  That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.” Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association, 559 S. Ct. 1448 (2010). 
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memorably discovered “more notions of rights, more principles of true freedom spread 
among them than in most of the peoples of Europe.”  Yet this “true freedom” was hardly 
absolute; far from strident libertarians, these forebears of the American state governed with 
a heavy hand, according to Tocqueville, not least in order to shape and maintain ideas.2  If the 
author of Democracy in America is to be trusted, the Court’s video-game decision in 2011 
deviated conspicuously from the approach of the first Americans.  Indeed, it would seem 
that Tocqueville, far more than Scalia, recognized government’s ideological aims—and its 
tendency to pursue those aims. 
     The governments of these early Americans were surely not the first to demand a certain 
homogeneity of ideas, beliefs, “mores,” and so on among ordinary people, and certainly they 
were not the last, as I show in detail in the present study.  But rather than focusing here on 
the United States and its democratic analogues in Europe and elsewhere, I turn instead to 
authoritarian states.  While ideological resources are an essential element of power in all political 
contexts, and as such are neither incidental nor peripheral to state officials, I argue that this 
is especially so in authoritarian situations.  In particular, I endeavor in this paper, like the 
Supreme Court in 2011, to consider the relationship between state ideological goals, on the 
one hand, and young people, on the other.  I try to show that states’ attempts to inure their 
youth populations to the beliefs, convictions, and values of officialdom constitute a critical 
element of modern social life.  As we will see in Chapter I, “bringing youth in” to the study 
of the modern state addresses a long-overlooked gap in the literature.  The present paper is 
                                                 
2 According to Tocqueville’s latter-day account, “legislators…constantly penetrate into the domain of 
conscience,” he seethed, “and there is almost no sin that does not fall subject to the censure of the magistrate.” 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 29 and 38, respectively. 
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meant to begin what has the potential to be, and certainly deserves to be, a much bigger 
project.  
     To be clear, my focus on authoritarian states in the present paper should not be taken to 
mean that state-youth relations are unimportant in liberal democracies.  But whereas liberal 
democracies, by definition, protect certain freedoms—freedoms of association, religion, 
speech, and so on—which militate against the ideological hegemony of the state itself, 
authoritarian states’ quest for ideological resources tends to go largely unchecked.  States of 
the authoritarian sort are relatively free to pursue ideological hegemony legally, and indeed 
often go so far as to prohibit organized opposition.  With regard to young people in 
particular, time and again authoritarian states have betrayed their fear of losing the loyalty 
and obedience of children, adolescents, and young adults.  The authoritarian youth group, or 
AYG, whose contours I begin to sketch in this short study, is a manifestation of this fear.     
     My initial interest in young people and their relationship to the state was sparked a few 
years ago, when I was in high school.  Only in graduate school, however, have I begun 
seriously to examine the political implications and significance of this relationship.  I would 
certainly not have been able to do so, and would not have thought to do so, without the 
counsel of my able and enthusiastic adviser, Professor Gerald Easter.  I thank Professor 
Easter for his good cheer and generosity, his intelligence, his patience, and for his trust.  
Many thanks are due also to Professor Jonathan Laurence, whose advice, erudition, and great 
kindness I appreciate very much.  
     I am forever indebted to Professor Kathleen Bailey, with whom I wrote my BA thesis 
and under whose tutelage I came to love comparative politics, and to Professor Robert 
Faulkner, whose generosity and kindness I will never forget.  I thank also Professor Dana 
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Sajdi, a great intellectual, a wonderful teacher, and a dear friend, and my mentor, Dean Akua 
Sarr, for her years of friendship, encouragement, and support.  In addition, and not 
incidentally, I wish to thank (in alphabetical order) Professors Ali Banuazizi, Tim Crawford, 
David Deese, Jytte Klausen, and Shep Melnick.  Each has taught me a great deal about 
politics and scholarship.  Thanks are also due to Dr. Elizabeth Vinton, from whose care and 
wisdom I have long benefited, and to Carol Fialksoky and Shirley Gee for their assistance 
over the years. 
     Finally, from the bottom of my heart, I thank my family.  Without the constant 
encouragement and love of my parents, David and Terrilyn, I would scarcely have made it to 
Boston six years ago, much less Boston College.  I thank also my sister, Emily, whose 
individualism, intelligence, and wit would make her a great source of irritation to any 
authoritarian regime.  And I thank Braden Pate, my one and only, who gives me the stars 
and the moon every day.  
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Chapter I:  Bringing Youth In 
“[A] government knows only how to dictate precise rules; it imposes the sentiments and the ideas 
that it favors, and it is always hard to distinguish its counsels from its orders.” 
—Alexis de Tocqueville1  
I.  Introduction:  Authoritarian Youth Groups and Ideology as a Power 
Resource 
 
     The present study rests on the theoretical premise that the modern state works hard to 
promote certain ideas among its citizens or subjects, precisely in order to promote itself and 
its objectives.  State officials do so consciously, acting as competitors with actors at the civil-
society level, who similarly seek to curry ideological support for themselves and for their 
own agendas.  Stated broadly, this basic competition is the subject of this paper.  Specifically, 
I train my focus on states’ ideological power vis-à-vis young people.  The nexus between this 
population and state power is crucial, yet has gone all but unnoticed by comparativists.  In 
the following pages, I offer a description of the project at hand and provide a short review 
of the relevant literature.     
     In particular, this study tries to examine the common but little-studied political institution 
that I call the authoritarian youth group (AYG).  Authoritarian youth groups are cadres of youth 
which are constructed and maintained by authoritarian states for primarily (I will argue) 
ideological purposes.  Examples of AYG include, from the former Soviet Union, the All-
Union Leninist Communist Youth League (VLKSM, or Komsomol); from Nazi Germany, 
the Hitler Youth (Hitler Jugend, or HJ); and various contemporary groups, such as Nashi 
                                                            
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 492. 
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(“Ours”) in Russia, to which we turn in Chapter IV.  By elucidating the principal functions 
of these groups, the paper aims to shine light on a critical feature of the authoritarian state. 
     Although states construct authoritarian youth groups for myriad purposes, usually under 
the pressures of war or impending war, their most important function tends to be the 
ideological.  More often than not, even if they perform other functions, AYG are intended 
by their creators to diffuse, and sometimes to enforce, the beliefs, customs, and values of the 
state.  AYG are intended by states to “suck up the oxygen”:  to drown out private youth 
associations and to counteract, or even silence, non-state sources of ideas and opinion to 
which young people might be attracted.  I argue that all states, but especially authoritarian 
states, seek ideological resources, not least among young people, in order to undergird their 
infrastructural capacity, that is, their influence within—and over—society.2  Ultimately, a state is 
strong not merely by collecting revenue and wielding coercion, but also by conceiving and 
disseminating ideas, narratives, and counter-narratives. 
     Indeed, it is revealing that the great despotisms of the nineteenth century could far more 
readily advance a limited form of “social citizenship,” to borrow T.H. Marshall’s language, 
than “political citizenship.”  Why?  It would seem that whereas the former implied a certain 
narrow social-welfare regime (some degree of workers’ protection, for instance), the latter 
implied, at least in part, that ordinary people would be free to access and distribute ideas.  
Arguably, widespread political citizenship was slower to emerge because state officials 
                                                            
2 In a well-known formulation, Michael Mann differentiates “despotic power” from “infrastructural power,” and 
thereby assesses the relative ability of the state effectively to make policy—separate and apart from “civil society 
groups”—on the one hand, and then actually to implement that policy, on the other.  Unlike despotic power, 
infrastructural power therefore implies that “the state actually…penetrate[s] civil society, [that it is able] to 
implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of 
the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” in States in History, ed. John A. Hall, 109-136 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd, 1986). 
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believed they could ill-afford the competition that it would entail.  That is, at least in some 
sense, governments clearly feared losing ideological resources more than they feared the 
monetary expenditures necessitated by the welfare state.3  Thus, for instance, the Soviet state 
could pride itself on the robustness of its social-welfare offerings even as it demanded 
ideological predominance.4       
     The AYG phenomenon on which this paper focuses lends itself precisely to the sort of 
cross-case analysis that this study endeavors to provide.  Even the Hitler Jugend, arguably 
the most ambitious AYG ever constructed, is in most ways quite similar to other 
authoritarian youth groups.  To be sure, what made the HJ more ambitious than other AYG 
is that membership in it was mandatory for young Germans:  in March 1939, on the eve of 
the war, the state decreed that every person aged between ten and eighteen was required to 
serve in the HJ.5  No other AYG that we will encounter in this study, including the Soviet 
Komsomol, required all of its young subjects to join.  Nevertheless—and this is the most 
important point—the essential ideological goals of the HJ were remarkably consistent with 
the ideological goals of AYG in general.  It would seem that states, across space and time, 
                                                            
3 “The sticking-point was over political citizenship,” writes Michael Mann of these states in his critique of 
Marshall.  “Real parliaments could not be conceded; democrats could not be allowed absolute freedoms of the 
press, speech or assembly.” Mann, States, War and Capitalism:  Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Ltd, 1988), 197. 
4 In general, see Neil Robinson, Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System:  A Critical History of Soviet Ideological 
Discourse (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1995), especially 25-29, and Gabriel A. Almond, 
“Communism and Political Culture Theory,” Comparative Politics 15, no. 2 (Jan. 1983):  127-138, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/421672. 
5 It is important to recognize that this was no small feat.  As Sheri Berman has pointed out, civil society thrived 
under the transitory Weimar government, providing space to actors of many stripes in which to seek power.  
Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 
401-429, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054008.  In this respect, youth groups were no exception.  As Herbert 
Moller writes, “Even during the relatively prosperous years of the Weimar Republic, young people of the large 
youth cohorts were marching and rallying.  Never before had German youth formed so many organizations, 
each of which combined comradeship among members with intense hatred of opponents.” Herbert Moller, 
“Youth as a Force in the Modern World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 10, no. 3 (April 1968): 244, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/177801. 
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tend to have four distinct but interrelated ideological objectives vis-à-vis their youth 
populations, and that these objectives are abundantly in evidence in the AYG that they erect.  
In the next section, we will turn to each of these objectives in turn. 
     It must be said that the authoritarian youth group is by no means the only tool with 
which states attempt to achieve ideological power over young people.  Research has shown 
that public education, most importantly, is formative not only of youth identity by its very 
nature,6 but also that it has important political effects.7  It would seem, indeed, that V.I. 
Lenin’s famous characterization of “the state” as “a special kind of cudgel”8 is accurate, but 
only partially so; the Bolshevik leader might have added that the state is also, and not 
incidentally, a special kind of pedagogue.  Certainly the public schoolroom, more than any 
other modern space, has become central to states’ ideological goals.  Perhaps most notable in 
this regard is the French state, which has transformed the schoolhouse into a production 
center for young citoyens.  As Eugen Weber demonstrated in his path-breaking study of state-
building in nineteenth-century France, the late 1800s witnessed a dramatic push by the state 
to educate French youngsters not only in the French language (which was astonishingly 
                                                            
6 See, e.g., Bayat and Herrera, who write, “Mass schooling is instrumental in the production and prolongation 
of being young, because it sets youngsters apart from the world of work and responsibility, while at the same 
time generating some degree of self-reliance where the individual makes choices and expresses autonomous 
ideas.” Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, “Introduction: Being Young and Muslim in Neoliberal Times,” in Being 
Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North, eds. Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 6. 
7 A recent study of schools in the UK and Germany, for example, illustrates the capacity of the school to mold 
students’ postures toward their own countries and to “Europe” as a whole.  Whereas German schools tend to 
focus on “Europe,” rather than the German nation-state per se, British kids are much more exposed to British 
identity than to a European identity as such.  The results are intuitive:  schoolchildren in Germany, the study 
claims, are much more accustomed to the European identity than are their British counterparts. Daniel Faas, 
“Youth, Europe and the Nation: the Political Knowledge, Interests and Identities of the New Generation of 
European Youth,” Journal of Youth Studies 10, no. 2 (2007): 161-181, http://hdl.handle.net/2262/22299. 
8 Quoted in Gerald M. Easter, “The Russian State in the Time of Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 24, no. 3 (2008): 206, 
doi: 10.2747/1060-586X.24.3.199.   
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absent from the quotidian realities of many “French” citizens) but also in French 
nationalism.9  As Weber noted, education “had to teach children national and patriotic 
sentiments, explain what the state did for them and why it exacted taxes [capital] and military 
service [coercion], and show them their true interest in the fatherland.”10 
      And France was not alone:  in Germany during World War I, the state turned to “war 
pedagogy,” or Kriegspädagogik, transforming the formerly apolitical classroom into a 
production center for young ideologues.  As Andrew Donson shows in his recent study, this 
new approach to education was warmly embraced and enormously effective, ginning up 
youngsters as never before.11  Clearly, then, in Germany as in France, the school became but 
one of various features of public life through which the state sought to influence young 
people.  But whereas public education has long provoked the interest of scholars, the 
significance of the authoritarian youth group has been, if not disputed, generally ignored.  
II. AYG and Ideology as a Total Culture  
 
     Scholars of comparative politics have spilt a great deal of ink in recent decades 
highlighting the prominent role of the state in the modern world.  This reemergence of 
interest in the state can be traced to the late 1960s, when the erstwhile predominance of 
                                                            
9 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1976), 310-314 and 330-338.  It should be noted also that the promulgators of the Revolution 
of 1789 had been keenly aware of the role education could play, and ought to play, in the promotion of 
national feelings, but they never lived to see their ambitions on this score realized. Weber, Peasants into 
Frenchmen, 334.   
10 Ibid., 332. See also 336. 
11 It is important to note that the apolitical nature of the classroom was not a result merely of “custom” but 
also—and revealingly—of law.  But a funny thing happened when war came in 1914.  As one scholar notes, 
“Because of the Burgfrieden and the censorship of pacifists, officials and teachers no longer believed that the 
topic of German world power was political and violated custom and paragraph 17 of the Reich Law of 
Association.  As a result, teachers now regularly discussed German military might with their pupils.” Andrew 
Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land:  War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 
MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), 59. 
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behavioralist accounts waned as scholars rediscovered the explanatory power of official 
institutions as independent variables.  By “bringing the state back in,” scholars dramatically 
reoriented comparative politics, such that today the autonomy of the state is practically 
axiomatic.12  This paper joins this tradition.  Here I posit “the state…not as neutral, but as an 
actor in its own right and in competition with societal actors over power resources.”13  The 
state I describe is not a referee on the sidelines, as the liberal conception would imagine it, 
but a player on the field; it is neither a natural outgrowth of its population (or its “nation”), 
as a certain organic understanding implies, nor the tool of the capitalist bourgeoisie or 
international financial barons, as Marxists and neo-Marxists would have it.  Instead, the state 
is an actor all its own, possessed of its own interests and its own set of tools with which to 
pursue those interests.  Among states’ chief interests is ideological power, which it endeavors 
with particular avarice to attain among young people. 
     The term “ideological power” is bandied about in the academic literature, yet still seems 
to lack usable definitions.  No attempt toward an exhaustive definition is made here, but 
some unpacking of the term is nevertheless necessary.  A useful starting point comes from 
what is perhaps an unlikely source.  In 1935, an astute observer of culture and politics, 
Herman Finer, published a lengthy exegesis on the Fascist state in Italy, then at the height of 
its power.  In Mussolini’s Italy, Finer dissects, piece-by-piece, the world that the Duce created.  
Especially useful for our purposes here is a memorable passage in which Finer describes the 
totality of Mussolini’s ideological goals vis-à-vis youngsters: 
                                                            
12 See Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In:  Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the 
State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 3-37. 
13 Easter, “The Russian State,” 201.  
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The Fascist [Finer tells us] says, “Let us secure the young people before they have 
time to think; before other ideas are put into their heads by teaching or experience.  
Let us teach them the truth before they have learnt error.  Let us take them when 
they are impressionable, and if they should never become entirely anyone else’s.”  
The theory is to strengthen some of the dispositions in the young, and to atrophy 
others; to make some reactions prompt, automatic, and pleasurable, and others 
painful.  Reason will thus be excluded or attenuated, and an automatically uttered 
phrase will be the screen between reality and mind.14 
 
Young people, then, were to be shaped by the state, in no insignificant way.  They were to be 
fed beliefs and opinions, as a matter of course, but more than that they were to be conditioned; 
their “reason” was to be taken from them and replaced with particular feelings and modes of 
thought.  These feelings and modes of thought were to be determined from above and 
were—crucially—to be unfettered by society-level actors.    
     All states, as we have already said, whether liberal-democratic or “totalitarian,” aim to 
condition the populations they govern to some extent.  In general, we might say that 
“ideological power” refers to the capacity of a state, and indeed any organization—a state, an 
agency within a state, a political party, a firm, or any organization of the sort—to produce 
within a given population dedication to and support for that organization.  However, as we 
have already started to see, the competition for ideological resources which takes place in 
liberal contexts prevents any one actor, public or private, from achieving ideological 
predominance.  Only in authoritarian contexts, where such competition is, if not stamped 
out, severely curtailed, can the state achieve near-total ideological hegemony.  Young people 
in general, and authoritarian youth groups in particular, are often critical in pursuing that 
goal.     
                                                            
14 Herman Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, rev. ed. (1935; repr., Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964), 426. 
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     To some extent, the processes by which this hegemony is achieved might be termed 
“socialization,” but that does not quite express the totality of the phenomenon in its most 
extreme form.  Moreover, it is more than “ideology” as such that these states intend to 
propagate.  What we actually mean when we speak of authoritarian states’ “ideological” aims 
is these states’ capacity (and their exploitation of that capacity) to produce and mandate no 
less than a total culture.  Ideology of a peculiarly religious sort is indeed the DNA of this 
culture insofar as it informs its content, erects its demigods, and announces its sins and its 
sinners.  But it is important to recognize that “ideological power,” at least in the 
authoritarian or totalitarian context, is not narrow or limited, but total.  For these 
governments, not just any culture, but only an all-encompassing culture, is acceptable.  These 
cultures are all-encompassing both in that they are intended to affect every aspect of life for 
those living within them and in that they seek to destroy any cultural marker which 
contradicts, or even subordinates, their omnipotence.  As one historian notes of the Third 
Reich, “National Socialism was a religion; the depth of the ideology, the liturgy, the element 
of hope, all helped to give the movement the character of a new faith….  Nazism was a total 
world view which by its very nature excluded all others.”15   
     The totality of these cultural-political ideologies is evident, for example, in the 
politicization of seemingly apolitical activities.  What is more, this transformation of the 
apolitical into the deeply political, the private into the public, is often especially evident in 
                                                            
15 George L. Mosse, “Introduction,” in Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich, ed. 
George L. Mosse (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), xxxi. See also, for example, where 
Heinrich Himmler said this to some of his generals:  “Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death 
interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur:  otherwise, it is of no interest to me.” 
Quoted in Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca and 
London:  Cornell University Press, 1989), 127.  
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states’ treatment of young people in AYG.  The political implications of long hikes through 
the woods, for example, might not at first be apparent to most of us, but to the Hitler Youth 
such hikes were entirely political.  Baldur von Schirach, the chief of youth affairs in the Third 
Reich, said so explicitly: 
If German youth today takes hikes, it does not do so with a false and gushing 
sentimentality intoxicated with Nature, but even here it subordinates its action to a 
political purpose.  German youth roams the countryside in order to know its fatherland 
and, above all, comrades in other parts of the Reich.  Anyone who has experienced 
the German Volk community and has learned to appreciate his fatherland in this 
way, in terms of the National Socialist ideology, will be able, if called upon to do so, 
to defend this state with his life.16 
 
     Again:  the transformation of a hike in the forest into an explicitly political venture is of 
course characteristic of Nazi Germany and its authoritarian brethren insofar as these states 
considered all behavior political to one degree or another.  According to von Schirach, 
hiking in the woods—which had been, not incidentally, a standard activity of youth groups 
in the pre-Nazi era17—had profound nationalist implications, for young people and for the 
whole of the Volk.  Hikes, then, like so many other activities of no obvious political value, 
clearly contributed to the ideological power of the state.  Alternative youth groups, 
meanwhile, that is to say youth groups beyond the control of the state, had been banned by 
law in Germany, limiting youth associational life to the Hitler Jugend and the other Nazi 
AYG. 
     Sometimes, even basic behavioral norms and standards, which are on their face totally 
unrelated to political life, are intertwined by AYG with deeply political principles.  Pioneers 
in early Communist China, for example, were told to live by several “rules of conduct” 
                                                            
16 Baldur von Schirach, “The Hitler Youth,” in Mosse, Nazi Culture, 296. Emphasis added. 
17 See, e.g., Michael Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 20. 
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which “required them to study well, work well, love the collective, struggle against bad people 
and bad deeds, and refrain from beating or scolding.”18  The politicization of the putatively 
apolitical was also a major feature of the Soviet Union, and, in fact, as one excellent study of 
the Komsomol notes, some members of that AYG were actually most attracted to its 
seemingly apolitical activities, precisely because they lacked obvious political overtones.19  
Still—and this was the important point—politics could never be eluded:  
The literary, dramatic, dancing, and singing groups which the Komsomol sponsors 
provide some relief from the incessant and concentrated political bombardment to 
which youth is exposed, but even these forms of social-cultural activity are far from 
being apolitical. Komsomolites participating in a series of evenings devoted to 
Pushkin discuss papers on such themes as “Pushkin and the Decembrists,” “Pushkin 
on Capitalism,” “Pushkin-Patriot,” “Pushkin and the Present,” and “Pushkin’s 
Criticism of America.”  The dramatic groups read and produce plays from the 
contemporary Soviet repertoire which are heavily saturated with doctrinal content.  
Even the dancing and singing are partly organized around political themes.  In the 
Soviet state there is no real escape from the long arm of ideological control.20 
 
     But what did this “long arm” hope to achieve?  With what beliefs, convictions, and values 
do authoritarian states wish to imbue their young people?  To what influences do they wish 
to expose them, and from what influences do they wish to shield them?  That is, what are 
states’ specific ideological aims vis-à-vis young people?  I argue that they tend to be of four 
distinct but interrelated types.  Subsequent chapters will try to demonstrate that these four 
basic goals, enumerated and described presently, are evident in the practices and 
pronouncements of AYG. 
                                                            
18 Victor C. Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949-1966,” The China Quarterly, no. 42 
(April-June 1970): 126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/6520333. Emphasis added. 
19 The state demanded that Komsomol members engage in “social-cultural activity” so as “to cultivate many-
sided interests in order to make himself a ‘whole’ man.  This is the area which the less fervid members find 
most attractive, because of its relative removal from the political realm.” Quoted in Merle Fainsod, “The 
Komsomols—A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship,” The American Political Science Review 45, no. 1 (March 
1951): 34, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950882.           
20 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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A. State Raison d’être:  National Mythology and the Necessity of the State 
     In the classic sociological formulation, “stable authority” has two ingredients:  power and 
legitimacy.21  But how is power maintained and legitimated in authoritarian states?  The 
question is an old one, but it remains timely both for historians and for students of politics.  
For modern states, one well-worn path to legitimacy is “national” or statist mythology.  Such 
mythology insists not only on the naturalness of the state but also on the necessity of the 
state for the continuation of the nation.  This is clearly true not only in authoritarian, but 
also in liberal-democratic, contexts.  The preservation of the Crown was essential to the 
preservation of the English people, e.g., in the same way that the rarefied stature of the 
Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. ensured the continuation of international, socialist 
revolution.  I argue that promulgating this sense of the state’s necessity is a key objective of 
AYG. 
     Authoritarian states of revolutionary origin arguably work especially hard to impress 
upon their subjects, and maybe their youngest subjects in particular, these nationalist-statist 
raisons d’être.  Exactly because they acquired power on the basis of revolution, governors in 
these states tend to be particularly bent on continually ensuring that the original 
revolutionary fervor which brought them to power is felt by every successive “generation.”  
Only by doing so can they (or so they seem to believe) maintain their authority.  Because, in 
general, these states’ embryonic forms were “intolerant radical reformist movements” (the 
early Nazis in Germany and the Bol’sheviks in Communist Russia come to mind 
immediately), statesmen have little choice but “to generate waves of simulated permanent 
                                                            
21 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1960), 39.  
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revolution to harness the energies of new generations, lest genuine, ideologically 
independent and thus revisionist social movements displace the prevalent political order.”22  
In this sense, AYG are clearly meant to be bulwarks against counter-revolutionary forces.  
When Leonid Brezhnev, for example, worried aloud at the Komsomol Congress in 1966 that 
contemporary youngsters, far removed from the Revolution of 1917, would be unable to 
carry on the socialist revolution with the same gusto of their parents and grandparents, he 
expressed an anxiety common to revolutionary despots.23       
B. National Homogeneity 
     Part and parcel of national myth-making is an insistence on the homogeneity of the 
national population.  The National Socialists in interwar Germany offer the most well-
known and surely the most hideous example of this aspect of nationalism, but in fact the 
myth of national homogeneity of one sort or another—civic, ethnic, racial—is 
commonplace.  Moreover, there is a clear connection between perceived national 
homogeneity among a populace and the amassment of the tangible power resources, money 
and coercive strength, by the state.  As Anthony W. Marx notes, “People are usually willing 
to sacrifice their money, lives, or liberty”—all demanded by the modern state by way of 
taxation, war, and often substantial regulatory regimes—“only to those with whom they feel 
                                                            
22 As a result, as one scholar has put it, “one of the measures of totalitarianism [is] whether or not it manages to 
evolve a comprehensive youth organization.  Such a youth organization is considered an indispensable agent 
for the socialization of maturing youth.” Daniel Kubat, “Totalitarian Youth Movement As a Career 
Mechanism:  The Case in Czechoslovakia,” Social Forces 43, no. 3 (March 1965): 417-418, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2574772.   
23 See the quotation in Jeffrey W. Hahn, “The Komsomol Kollektiv as an Agency of Political Socialization,” 
Youth and Society 1, no. 2 (Dec. 1969): 220, http://pao.chadwyck.com/PDF/1330357553100.pdf. See also 
Chapter III of this study. 
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a bond of similarity.”24  Likewise, and needless to say, the enemy nation’s putative 
differences, real or imagined, are always ripe for exploitation and vilification by the 
nationalist state. 
     If only as a short aside, it is worth noting that young people are very frequently 
nationalism’s greatest adherents, its leaders as well as its most strident followers.  This may 
help explain the great lengths to which states go to ensure that youngsters are avid adherents 
to the nationalist credo.  As Herbert Moller points out in a far-reaching study, young people 
were instrumental to the making of the French Revolution of 1789,25 in which the great 
puissance of nationalism first revealed itself, and, similarly, in the middle of the nineteenth 
century the great Italian nationalists Mazzini and Garibaldi relied on the support of 
youngsters, as they acknowledged.  Mazzini, for instance, expected to discover among young 
people “a host of apostles for the new religion,” as he put it26—and, it would seem, his 
prediction was right.  By the dawn of the twentieth century, when Europe’s great empires 
were (though their leaders may not have known it) on their last legs, young people were 
often at the heart of resistance movements.  As Moller notes, for instance, the greatest threat 
to the Habsburgs came from nationalist Serbs and Croats in would-be Yugoslavia, precisely 
where the population of Austria-Hungary was the youngest and precisely where Archduke 
Ferdinand’s assassin was mobilized, by June 1914, as part of the Young Bosnia movement.27   
     At the level of the authoritarian youth group, homogeneity among members is 
consistently sought by state architects, particularly in order to sap individualism, promote 
                                                            
24 Anthony W. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
33.   
25 Moller, “Youth as a Force,” 240.  
26 Quoted in ibid., 241. 
27 Ibid. 242-243. 
14 
 
esprit de corps, and heighten feelings of national fraternity.  For example, Michael Kater attests 
the strict homogeneity demanded by the Hitler Youth.  He also shows the blurry line 
between political ideology and culture: 
The HJ’s idealized self-image was stiflingly uniform and militantly exclusive at 
the same time….  This uniformity was manifested not just by the required 
clothing—black shorts and trousers and khaki shirts for the boys, and long 
braids or rolls for the girls.  Within specifically German frameworks, the 
ideologically racist Hitler Youth defined itself for practical purposes through folk 
songs, life in the outdoors, and physical exercise—said to be the opposite of 
international decadent Jewry, American-style films and jazz, and modern 
international art forms.28 
  
C. Reproduction from Above:  the Familial-Sexual Narrative 
     It is one of the paradoxes of authoritarian governance that the state must at once 
promote family life whilst seeking, if not the outright destruction of families, then certainly 
the transformation of the traditional family in light of its own power interests.  Naturally, 
concerns about family life and the various tangential issues (abortion, adoption, marriage, 
and so on) are not unique to governors of authoritarian states.  Reproduction, in particular, 
arouses unique concern among policymakers in states of all stripes.  That states of all sorts 
require populations, and that procreation is the only way to maintain and develop 
populations, is intuitive enough.  But the ideological imperatives of the authoritarian state, 
rather than merely the biological imperatives of population maintenance, tend to necessitate a 
particularly aggressive circumscription of familial autonomy.  Man and woman must devote 
themselves to one another and produce children, but their devotion to the family as such 
must be rather less than total.  Among the results is that the familial diversity common in 
certain liberal societies today—the presence and widespread toleration of one-parent 
                                                            
28 Kater, Hitler Youth, 27. 
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families, same-sex couples, and so on—has little or no place in the authoritarian state, where 
governors have proved far more amenable to traditionalism than to the burgeoning customs 
of freer societies around the world.  Homosexuality, in particular, tends to be considered a 
great sin by authoritarian orthodoxy.   
     Children, meanwhile, with whom we are most concerned here, are ideally far less 
dependent on Mother and Father than on the State, which is frequently anthropomorphized 
as maternal or paternal in state mythology, not incidentally.  A poem featured in a Nazi 
textbook, for example, depicted children loving Hitler as they loved their parents.  The kids 
were shown “offering to help, obey and make him happy,” just as they would their parents.29  
In addition, and even more important than this, are efforts by states to drive children away 
from their parents and toward the open arms of the state.  As Finer noted in his study of life 
in Fascist Italy, a sort of “moral kidnapping” was taking place there, such that children, led 
from Mother and Father by “non-rational seductions,” rejected the home in favor of the 
Fascist state.30   
     Sometimes authoritarian states succeed in one of their ghastliest goals:  rendering parents 
afraid of their children.  It was precisely this phenomenon upon which the playwright Bertolt 
Brecht put his finger in the 1930s when he wrote “The Spy,” a short scene in his play, Fear 
and Misery of the Third Reich, to which we will turn in the next chapter.31  Revealingly, several 
years later, well after the end of the Second World War and the collapse of Nazism, George 
                                                            
29 Lisa Pine, “The Dissemination of Nazi Ideology and Family Values through School Textbooks,” History of 
Education 25, no. 1 (1996): 96, doi: 10.1080/0046760960250106.   
30 Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 441. 
31 Bertolt Brecht, Fear and Misery of the Third Reich, in Bertolt Brecht Collected Plays, vol. 4, bk. 3, Bertolt Brecht: Plays, 
Poetry and Prose, eds. John Willett and Ralph Manheim, trans. John Willett (London: Methuen, 1979), 53-62. 
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Orwell would examine this theme, among others, in 1984.  One particular passage from the 
novel is worth quoting at length: 
With Julia, everything came back to her own sexuality….  Unlike Winston, she had 
grasped the inner meaning of the Party’s sexual puritanism.  It was not merely that 
the sex instinct created a world of its own which was outside the Party’s control and 
which therefore had to be destroyed if possible.  What was more important was that 
sexual privation induced hysteria, which was desirable because it could be 
transformed into war-fever and leader-worship.  The way she put it was:  
     “When you make love you’re using up energy; and afterwards you feel happy and 
don’t give a damn for anything.  They can’t bear you to feel like that.  They want you 
to be bursting with energy all the time.  All this marching up and down and cheering 
and waving flags is simply sex gone sour.  If you’re happy inside yourself, why should 
you get excited about Big Brother and the Three-Year Plans and the Two Minutes 
Hate and all the rest of their bloody rot?”  
     That was very true, he thought.  There was a direct, intimate connection between 
chastity and political orthodoxy.  For how could the fear, the hatred, and the lunatic 
credulity which the Party needed in its members be kept at the right pitch except by 
bottling down some powerful instinct and using it as a driving force?  The sex 
impulse was dangerous to the Party, and the Party had turned it to account.  They 
had played a similar trick with the instinct of parenthood.  The family could not 
actually be abolished, and, indeed, people were encouraged to be fond of their 
children, in almost the old-fashioned way.  The children, on the other hand, were 
systematically turned against their parents and taught to spy on them and report their 
deviations. The family had become in effect an extension of the Thought Police.  It 
was a device by means of which everyone could be surrounded night and day by 
informers who knew him intimately.32 
 
In truly a marvel of contemporary prose, Orwell points to several essential aspects of 
authoritarian governance, each having to do, again, with what in liberal contexts is generally 
recognized as private.  Authoritarian states, certainly including the “revolutionary” Fascist 
                                                            
32 George Orwell, 1984, rev. ed. (1949; repr., New York: Signet Classic, 1981), 110-111. Note also a revealing 
passage in which a student of postwar Stalinism writes, 
By the time the Soviet Union had matured into late Stalinism most of the optimism that had pervaded 
earlier periods with regard to the potential of love and sex as the building blocks of communism had 
vanished, leaving a brooding suspicion against emotions between individuals that were capable of rivaling 
official prescribed relations.  Freidnship, love, and sex, were perceived to pose a constant threat and danger 
lurking in the recesses of private intimacy and individual choice, unconquered by Soviet collectivity and 
control. 
Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 252.  
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and Communist states, demand “sexual puritanism,” even as they also demand—for the 
same reason—procreation.  The family, meanwhile, was most assuredly to be preserved, but 
its most vulnerable members, the children, were more useful to the state as its agents than as 
the loving disciples of their parents.     
D. Planning for the Future:  Building the Next State Elite 
     As Joseph Goebbels famously put it:  “He who has the young has the future.”33  States 
tend to use authoritarian youth groups not only to indoctrinate youngsters, inuring them to 
the norms and teachings of the official ideology, but also as training programs for the next 
generation of state leaders and bureaucrats.  That is, authoritarian youth groups are both 
formative and productive:  formative of state loyalists in the short term and productive of 
the next crop of apparatchiki in the long term.  Again and again, young people are asked to 
accept state orthodoxy and to prepare to contribute to its next leaders.  This appears to be 
especially true in states of revolutionary origins, where, as we have already started to see, 
officials tend to fear the revolutionary fervor of young people. 
III. Conceptualizing AYG and the Organization of the Paper 
     Conceptualizing authoritarian youth groups34 is challenging for two reasons.  First, as we 
have started to see, comparativists have historically demonstrated relatively little interest in 
young people, in spite of their enormous political importance.  Moreover, when scholars do 
                                                            
33 Quoted in Michael Buddrus, “A Generation Twice Betrayed:  Youth Policy in the Transition from the Third 
Reich to the Soviet Zone of Occupation (1945-1946),” in Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation 
Formation in Germany 1770-1968, ed. Mark Roseman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 247. 
34 Because authoritarian youth groups are not wholly unique social phenomena, we ought to be able to classify 
them theoretically.  In thinking about AYG, we might think of Rosenau, who famously asks, “Of what is it an 
instance?”  As he writes, “To think theoretically is to be at home with abstractions, to generalize, to discern the 
underlying order that links otherwise discrete incidents, and such a mode of thinking cannot be achieved and 
maintained unless every observed phenomenon is approached as merely one instance of a recurring sequence.” 
James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, rev. and enlarged ed. (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) 
Limited, 1980), 24 and 25, respectively.  
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examine youth politics, they tend to focus on the political behavior and beliefs of young 
people rather than the official institutions which seek to affect them.  Second, while 
comparative politics has developed extensive literatures on various types of social 
organization (premodern clans and tribes, modern nations and nation-states, political parties, 
social movements, and so on), the authoritarian youth group seems not to fit the models of 
collective political action with which we are most familiar.  AYG are neither political parties 
nor interest groups, and they are also not “youth movements,” despite claims to the 
contrary.  In this section, I examine each of these challenges in turn.  I then offer a short 
description of the study at hand and present its basic organizational scheme. 
A. Youth and the Study of Politics  
     The seeming lack of interest in youth by comparativists is hard to square with the great 
significance of youngsters in politics.  There is no question but that a host of major policy 
arenas—crime control, healthcare, housing, immigration, poverty, and others—involves 
youngsters to one degree or another, and certainly education, more than any other major 
policy arena, is wrapped up immutably with young people and their fate.  Yet if 
comparativists have succeeded in “bringing the state back in,” we seem to have failed to 
bring in youth much at all.  Traditionally, among scholars of politics, political psychologists 
have taken perhaps the greatest interest in youth, but this has resulted largely in a focus on 
structural-sociological phenomena rather than expressly political factors.  That is, instead of 
focusing on the interests of the state vis-à-vis young people, scholars have tended to examine 
youngsters’ political beliefs and behavior.   
     Among the consequences of this focus on young people rather than the state as such has 
been the rise of the so-called “generational perspective.” For scholars in this school, “social 
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change” hinged on young people, whose lack of connectedness to the society around them 
permitted them to “question the conditions of the social order”—and to change it.35  This 
approach to youth politics has persevered.  Scholars who claim, for example, that youths’ 
penchant for new social instruments, such as the Internet, will make them “participants in 
the making of the new political order” draw on this tradition.36  A major forerunner of the 
generational approach was Karl Mannheim’s canonical essay, “The Problem of 
Generations,” in which he argued that individuals come to make up a generation not merely 
by sharing a chronological age with their co-generationals, but also by sharing a particular 
experience with them.37  In comparative politics, perhaps the most famous iteration of this 
approach is Ronald Inglehart’s The Silent Revolution, in which Inglehart observed a major shift 
in the “values” of Western Europeans and attributed the shift, in part, to the experiential 
variance from one generation to the next.38  In shaping “value priorities,” Inglehart insisted 
that “the impact of a given generation unit’s formative experiences seems to be the most 
significant variable not only empirically but theoretically as well.”  Maybe surprisingly, even 
the international-relations subfield has found a use for the “generational” approach.39   
     Quite clearly, then, in the study of history as well as politics, “generations” have proved 
to be of enduring interest to scholars.  In this paper, to highlight the pitfalls of this 
                                                            
35 Constance A. Flanagan and Lonnie R. Sherrod, “Youth Political Development: An Introduction,” Journal of 
Social Issues 54, no. 3 (1998): 448, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1998.tb01229.x.   
36 James Youniss, Susan Bales, Verona Christmas-Best, Marcelo Diversi, Milbrey McLaughlin, Rainer 
Silbereisen, “Youth Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Research on Adolescence 12, no. 1 
(2002): 138, doi: 10.1111/1532-7795.00027.  
37 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskemeti 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 276-320.   
38 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 96-97. 
39 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 253-257. 
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generational orientation (and there are a few) is less important than to point out in explicit 
terms that this study takes a different approach.  By avoiding the historicization and 
operationalization of “generations” and trying instead to “see like a state,”40 I set my goals 
apart from many others in the “youth studies” field.  To put it crudely:  I am less interested 
here in youngsters’ responses to the state than in states’ efforts to empower themselves over 
youngsters.  The argument set out here is not that young people tend to be slaves to the state; 
recent studies compellingly demonstrate that that is not so.  But it is equally true that young 
people, like all individuals, interact with one another within particular contexts and under the 
weight of certain institutionally-imposed constraints.  Among the most prevalent of these 
institutions is the AYG, which I try to examine here from the perspective of its architects 
rather than its members.   
B. Conceptualizing AYG 
     What, then, are authoritarian youth groups?  As we have already said, AYG are not 
political parties or social movements, nor are they departments or ministries.  Even analytic 
concepts which seem useful at first blush, such as neocorporatism, are in fact inappropriate 
for AYG (although it is true that AYG sometimes represent young people to state 
officialdom, and in this way they may act in a corporatist capacity).41  It turns out that the 
best starting point is the lesser-known concept of the “administered mass organization,” or 
                                                            
40 I paraphrase the title of James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State:  How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).  
41 Some partial analog might at first seem to exist between AYG and the various corporatist associations that 
have been contrived, especially by governments in Western Europe, since corporatism’s debut at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  First, like their corporatist confreres, AYG serve as interlocutors between one societal 
subpopulation (youth), on the one hand, and the state, on the other.  In the same way that the first corporatist 
associations existed at the meta-level in order to link state and civil-society organizations more closely, AYG 
are intended in part to connect officials to the many youngsters in their charge.  For an excellent review of 
corporatism’s history as well as one contemporary iteration of it, see Jonathan Laurence, “The Corporatist 
Antecedent of Contemporary State-Islam Relations,” European Political Science 8, no. 3 (September 2009): 305, 
doi:10.1057/eps.2009.15.   
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AMO, proposed and analyzed by Gregory J. Kasza in his slim but valuable study, The 
Conscription Society.42  Kasza argues that the first AMOs were developed by governments in 
response to the putative insufficiency of popular mobilization during the First World War.  
Having wrongly anticipated a relatively short period of fighting in the opening days of the 
war, and suffering from generally weak infrastructural power, states inadequately mobilized 
their civilian populations to support the war effort.  In order to rectify this deficiency, Kasza 
argues, states commenced to create AMOs.43  Authoritarian youth groups (as I call them) are 
one type of AMO.  Indeed, the world’s first AMO (by Kasza’s estimation), was designed to 
co-opt young people!  The group was set up in Japan in 1915 by the Home and Education 
Ministries “to organize boys during the six years between the age most left school and the 
age they became eligible for the draft and the reserves.”  The Great Japan Youth League got 
off to a slow start, as Kasza explains, but ultimately evolved “into a full-fledged AMO, and 
they complemented it with AMOs for women, local residents, and industrial producers.”44 
     It is worth pausing here, if only briefly, to highlight the etiology that Kasza suggests.  Not 
only the first AMO, but also the AMO as an institution, got its start because of war.45  The 
                                                            
42 Kasza is valuable on the neocorporatist point.  As he writes, neocorporatist organizations may indeed enjoy 
unique access to governments, but this  
special relationship…results from negotiation between two distinct entities….  Officials create AMOs 
to avoid the two-way pushing and pulling that characterizes the state’s interaction with interest 
groups, even in a neocorporatist context.  They seek instead a one-sided relationship that the regime 
will dominate from the outset.  In short, neocorporatism refers to a special relationship between the state 
and an interest group in a democratic framework, whereas AMOs embody an attempt by 
nondemocratic regimes to replace interest groups with a different type of organization.  
Gregory J. Kasza, The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1995), 10. Emphasis in original. 
43 Ibid., especially 15-18.    
44 Ibid., 18-19. 
45 We should remember what is perhaps Tilly’s most famous finding, that is, that “[w]ar made the state, and the 
state made war,” as he famously put it. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 
in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
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connection between AYG and war is similarly strong.  In early Communist China, the 
Chinese Youth League was actually “under the general direction” of the General Political 
Department of the People’s Liberation Army,46 and even Nashi, the Russian group to which 
we turn in Chapter IV, has its origins in war—or, at least, the fear of war.   
     In addition, outside the bounds of established politics, war has significant implications for 
young people and their relationship to the state.  World War I clearly drove many young 
Germans toward political radicalism, while World War II convinced many young Russians in 
Stalin’s Soviet Union of the frailty of the state and of Communism itself.47  Meanwhile, to 
the west in occupied Germany, thousands of young Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were 
forced to consider their futures—and, at least according to some of them, to consider the 
future of the Jewish people.  This pushed many toward Zionism and toward what would 
become the State of Israel.48      
     In general terms, then, war can push young people to embrace the state, to rebel against 
the state, or to organize in support of a new state altogether.  Authoritarian youth groups, as 
we have established, represent one way that states try to co-opt this population.  But how 
best to characterize AYG remains to be shown.  Again, Kasza’s study of AMOs, of which 
AYGs are one specific sort, provides the key.  Kasza correctly argues that the AMO as a 
political organization is distinct from the political party, which aims to acquire power by 
becoming part of government (from within), and the interest group, which acts at the society 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1975), 42. See also Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” in Evans, Rueschemyer, 
and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 169-191. 
46 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 123. 
47 See Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land and Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, respectively. 
48 Avinoam J. Patt, Finding Home and Homeland:  Jewish Youth in the Aftermath of the Holocaust (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press), 2009. 
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level to try to influence government (that is, from without).49  He does not note specifically 
that AMOs similarly cannot be classified as “movements,” but he scarcely needs to do.  
Movements, like interest groups, exist below the level of official politics, quite unlike AMOs 
(and AYGs, by extension).  AMOs are invented by states, by definition.  Indeed, by a 
paradox, the fallacious “movement” label is actually useful to states precisely because it 
connotes a grassroots organization rather than an arm of officialdom.  In the same way that 
officials might speak and act under the auspices of “war,” e.g., or “democratization,” in 
order to benefit from the specific connotations of such words,50 officials in authoritarian 
states may misuse the “movement” label for their own purposes.51  In general, while there 
are certainly cases in which actual social movements are handily coopted by states, as well as 
cases in which party-affiliated youth groups only become AYG upon their party’s seizure of 
power, AYG need not, as a rule, have society-level antecedents.52   
C. Objectives and Organization      
                                                            
49 In Kasza’s words, “The AMO’s assigned task is not to take control of the government, but to subordinate its 
members to a political elite that already controls the government.  AMOs are not organized spontaneously in 
civil society by persons who seek political power.  They are created by incumbent regime officials to augment 
their control over the rest of society.” Kasza, Conscription Society, 8; for his general discussion of the political 
party and the interest group, see 8-11. 
50 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 346. 
51 Consider the words of the Führer in 1934, from an address he gave to some sixty-thousand Hitler Youth 
members, in which he absurdly treats Nazism—which had by then overtaken the state, as he explicitly notes—
as a “movement.”  “Twelve months ago,” he said, “the struggle for power granted us success.  And since then 
our movement, whose young vanguard you are and whose standard bearers you will be, has repossessed one 
position after the other in this state….” Quoted in Kater, Hitler Youth, 68. Remarkably, even scholars 
sometimes fall into this trap.  For example, in his intriguing study of primary-source literature from the Soviet 
Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend, Gould missteps when he describes these organizations as “movements.” 
Julius Gould, “The Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend,” The British Journal of Sociology 2, no. 4 (December 1951): 
305-314, http://www.jstor.org/stable/588084.     
52 Moreover, sometimes former members of youth organizations actually transition to officialdom with ease.  
For example, several of the top Nazi bigwigs, including Heinrich Himmler and Auschwitz commandant Rudolf 
Hoess, were erstwhile members of the rightwing youth group Artamanen.  Not surprisingly, Artamanen 
transitioned like night into day from a free group in the Weimar era to a subsidiary of the Hitler Youth. Kater, 
Hitler Youth, 34. 
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     Finally, it is necessary to state precisely what this paper is (and what it is not) and to 
present its basic organizational scheme.  This study begins to develop an argument which, as 
I have tried to show in these opening pages, attempts in various ways to bolster and expand 
the academic literature on the modern state and youth.  In short, I argue that strong 
infrastructural power is contingent in large part on strong ideological power.  Ideological 
power therefore complements, rather than replaces, the state’s capacity to collect revenue 
and monopolize coercion.  The authoritarian youth group, which is one type of administered 
mass organization, is set up by states primarily to serve their ideological-power interests.  But 
the present paper is far from exhaustive.  Most of its conclusions are tentative.  More 
research on the cases examined here, and on other cases, is clearly necessary.  My goal in the 
following pages is simply to sketch the contours of the authoritarian youth group:  to reveal 
its objectives and its important role in authoritarian governance.  The paper should be 
viewed as expository, but it is ultimately only a first step toward what ought to be a rich 
literature on the modern state and young people.   
     The book consists primarily of case studies.  In Chapter II, I turn to the Fascists of the 
mid-twentieth century.  I pay particular attention to Germany under the National Socialists 
and Italy under Benito Mussolini.  In Chapter III I turn to the Communists.  I lay particular 
focus on the Komsomol, the most important AYG in the Soviet Union and, by 1991, the 
world’s largest youth organization.53  In Chapter IV, I examine the contemporary case of the 
Russian Nashi organization.  In my final chapter, I offer a short summary of the argument 
                                                            
53 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 363. 
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and suggest future avenues of research for scholars of the modern state and of youth 
politics.   
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Chapter II:  The Pied Piper Wears Black:  Fascist AYG 
I. Introduction:  The Cult of Youth and the Origins of Fascist AYG 
 
     The Fascists who came to power in interwar Europe conceived of themselves as 
participants in a youth movement.  Nationalists above all else, the Fascists consciously used 
youth and youthfulness as the centerpiece of their agenda in a way that previous nationalist 
movements had not.  The Fascists rallied supporters by decrying the establishment and 
promising that young people would be at the helm of the new guard.  If previous 
nationalisms had been “youth” movements only unconsciously and superficially, as we saw 
in the preceding chapter, the Fascists were explicit in their intentions:  the young would 
inherit the earth, and this meant that total control of the state—and ultimately the society 
beneath it—was the first step.   
     Sometimes, of course, this Fascist claim to youthfulness and supposed dedication to 
youth interests was less than believable.  One observer of Mussolini’s Italy, for instance, 
noted incredulously in 1935 that “the founder of the movement, only thirty-nine years of age 
when he arrived in Rome, is already fifty-one, and bald and grey”; meanwhile, wrote this 
astute onlooker, “many of the Fascist leaders [who] wore grey beards in the early days…are 
now either dead or doddering.”  Nevertheless, the cause of “youth,” endlessly romanticized 
by Mussolini and subsequently by Fascists elsewhere, was trumpeted.  Over time, “the Cult 
of Youth became a characteristic, and even the outstanding feature, of the Fascist 
movement.”1        
                                                            
1 The quotations belong to Herman Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, rev. ed. (1935; repr., Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 
1964), 413; see generally 413-414. 
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     Fascism’s lust for youth was not, however, as simple as preferring one age cohort to 
another.  In the Italian case, Mussolini sought youth figuratively no less than literally; the 
Duce sought young supporters, of course, but he also sought to take possession of the idea 
of youth.  In 1935, Herman Finer cheekily described the state’s top brass thus:  “They are all 
drunk with youth.  All promises are made to youth, all praises are sung to youth, all the 
future is entrusted to youth, it would seem sincerely and with confidence.”2  But the Cult of 
Youth fetishized youngsters not for their creativity or capacity for innovation, but rather for 
their fungibility and malleability.  Youngsters were cherished only insofar as they were useful 
to the state, and they were useful to the state only insofar as they could be trained to adhere 
to and defend the cultural-ideological universe which state officialdom aspired to create.  As 
Finer put it, in the Duce’s world, young people 
were to be ready to fight and do their duty, [and] their duty was to be a precise one, 
defined by the leaders.  They were not encouraged to become citizens with 
independent minds, to train themselves for responsibility, and to discover freely the 
duties they thought it right to perform….  [Y]outh has all the qualities of energy, 
generosity, enthusiasm, readiness to follow decided leadership, plasticity, which tend 
to action; and none of the qualities of knowledge, balance, reflection, self-criticism, 
experience of the margin between the ideal and the real, promise and performance, 
which would cause it to ask inconvenient questions of its leaders.3   
 
     Certainly, young people had been romanticized by political elites well before Mussolini’s 
day.  In Germany, for example, where “a veritable cult of youth” had developed in the 
Wilhelmine era, the Kaiser “was presented as the young emperor at the head of a young 
nation, ready to provide the inspiration for the creation of the more healthy world of the 
future.”  As one historian explains, a major effect of the Great War “was that people in 
                                                            
2 Ibid., 414. 
3 Ibid., 415. 
28 
 
virtually all youth associations started to think that they were the saving force for the nation 
and held the key to the future; they thus adopted the ideas of the youth cult of the pre-war 
years.”4  But the central position that youth and the idea of youth came to assume in Fascist 
contexts in the twentieth century was indeed novel, and clearly adumbrated the zeal with 
which the Fascist parties, once in control of states, would seek to control young people in 
the form of authoritarian youth groups.   
     Thus, in Italy in 1926, under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior, the state created the 
Institute for the National Balilla; shortly thereafter, in 1929, it would come under the control 
of the Ministry of Education.  In April 1928, six years after Mussolini’s ascension, the state 
legally eliminated all youth organizations other than its own, explicitly in order to gain 
ideological hegemony.5  As Finer points out, this constituted a major victory for the state in 
opposition to that most traditional source of ideological authority in Italy:  the Vatican.6  The 
major AYG for males in Fascist Italy were the Balilla, for boys between the ages of eight and 
fourteen, and the Avanguardisti, for male adolescents and young adults between the ages of 
fourteen and eighteen.7  In November 1934, the Wolf Cubs organization was created for 
kids between the ages of six and eight.8  For little girls, there were the Piccole Italiane, for 
                                                            
4 Jürgen Reulecke, “The Battle for the Young: Mobilising [sic] Young People in Wilhelmine Germany,” in 
Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770-1968, ed. Mark Roseman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 97 and 104, respectively. 
5 Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 427-428. 
6 “For how does the Balilla organisation [sic] conceive the task that lies before it?  Certainly in a religious spirit, 
but not in a Catholic Christian spirit.  Certainly as one of a grade of hierarchies leading up to an infallible 
authority, but not to the Pope.  Certainly as a progress in fidelity and sacrifice, but neither to Christ nor to 
Peace.” Ibid., 429.   
7 Ibid., 428. 
8 Ibid., 444 and 446.  
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those between the ages of six and fourteen, and Giovani Italiane, for those between 
fourteen- and eighteen-years.9    
     In the German case, the Hitler Jugend (HJ) as it would exist at the apex of its power had 
a somewhat more complicated path to hegemony.  The affairs of young people had been of 
great significance to the German state since at least the turn of the century.  Indeed, the 
newly-unified German state had flirted with the authoritarian youth group well before the 
ascendance of the National Socialists.  A turning point in Wilhelmine Germany came in 1911 
with the Prussian Jugendpflege Edict.  The Edict provided various financial goodies to 
“patriotic youth associations” whilst denying comparable benefits to Social Democratic 
youth groups.  The state’s aim was to instill patriotism in young people at the expense of 
“the secular, internationalist, and antimilitarist” agenda of the Social Democrats.10  Almost 
needless to say, the state’s objectives were to curry war-making prowess and—not 
incidentally—ideological resources.11  For example, the Jugendpflege created new 
bureaucrats tasked with establishing “military youth companies” for teenaged boys.  As 
Andrew Donson notes, these groups were of “little military value” (and thus did little to 
increase the state’s coercive or war-making power per se), yet “played a key role in making 
male youths excited about becoming soldiers,” and in this sense clearly had a significant 
ideological, as opposed to coercive, function.  The state-run “youth centers” that would 
                                                            
9 See ibid., 443-444. It should be noted that one observer, P.W.L. Cox, writes that boys between six- and 
fourteen-years, rather than eight- and fourteen-years (as Finer says), participated in the Balilla, but this appears 
to be a mistake.  The two authors, Finer and Cox, seem to agree on the ages for the girls’ groups.  It should be 
noted also that I rely on Cox for the Italian names of the girls’ organizations. P.W.L. Cox, “Opera Nazionale 
Balilla:  An Aspect of Italian Education,” in “Integration,” Junior-Senior High School Clearing House 9, no. 5 
(January 1935): 268, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30176386.   
10Andrew Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land:  War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914-1918 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), 53. 
11Ibid., 54. 
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emerge during the war reflected the same goal12 and clearly prefigured the militaristic 
ideology of the National Socialists.  
     There is no question but that polices like the Jugendpflege Edict reflected the Prussian 
state’s interest in currying ideological favor among young people—and in denying ideological 
power to alternative voices.  However, as we will see, an important theoretical and practical 
distinction separates such policies from the strategy Hitler would pursue twenty years later 
following the Weimar collapse.  If, under the Kaiser, the state’s ideological efforts vis-à-vis 
young people had stopped short of eliminating civil society, the Third Reich knew no such 
boundary, especially after 1936, when all youth organizations other than the Hitler Youth 
were banned.  While the Jugendpflege had existed alongside, rather than to the exclusion of, a 
variety of non-state groups— which “claim[ed],” in the words of one historian, “autonomy 
for the young generation”13—the National Socialists’ quest for ideological uniformity 
demanded that civil-society checks on the power of the Nazi state be eliminated.  Clearly 
enough, as we have already seen, Mussolini’s government in Italy took similar steps. 
     Especially in light of the HJ’s prominence in the collective memory of Nazism, it is 
noteworthy that young people as a population had not always been part of Hitler’s plan. 
Only on the eve of his ascension to the Chancellorship did Hitler’s astonishing aloofness to 
the utility of youth finally abate, reportedly after the Führer was counseled by such heavy-
hitters as Goebbels and Strasser.14  True, young Nazi sympathizers had long mobilized 
                                                            
12 Ibid., 116 and 143-144, respectively. 
13 Reulecke, “The Battle for the Young,” 101; see in general 99-101. 
14 One scholar notes,  
At first Hitler had been oblivious to the problems of youth, since adolescents were too young to vote 
or attain Party membership. Thus he could not understand why anyone among his followers would 
want to found, during the mid-1920s, a Nazi Students’ League. But once he had been persuaded by 
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behind the National Socialists, and certainly Hitler, like Mussolini, had always recognized the 
importance of young people in an abstract sense.  Hitler was first and foremost an ideologue, 
and his ideology was based on a race “theory” which, as such, was in large part contingent 
on reproduction and (consequently) on children.  But only well after his rise to power had 
begun did Hitler catch on to the immediate, political relevance of young people.     
     The first group of young Nazis to be affiliated with NSDAP emerged in 1925; the 
“Hitler-Jugend” appellation first appeared in 1926.  In 1930, the HJ expanded, inaugurating 
the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel, or BDM) as well as the Jungvolk for kids 
aged ten to fourteen.  Still, however—and this point cannot be neglected—the HJ at that 
point faced a serious competitor.  Still in 1930, the anti-Weimar and antisemitic Bundische 
Jugend enjoyed a far larger membership than the Nazis’ youth group, whose membership was 
only 20,000 compared to Bundische Jugend’s 50,000.15  Only after Hitler became Chancellor 
could Baldur von Schirach, the Nazis’ chief of youth affairs since 1931, commence to bring 
together all young Germans under the banner of the Hitler Youth.  Upon the Nazi seizure of 
power, as we saw above, all rival political parties and their affiliates, including their youth 
affiliates, were banned, and three years later, in February 1936, the Gestapo proscribed all 
non-Nazi youth groups.  At this point, “[t]he annual enrolment of 10-year-olds became 
bureaucratic routine; only in the big cities and sometimes in rural districts was there any 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
his supporters of the importance of young people, and when he realized that adolescents over sixteen 
were useful in big-city street fights, he acquiesced and made overtures to the youth. No doubt 
influenced by more astute tacticians such as Joseph Goebbels and Gregor Strasser, Hitler 
acknowledged by 1930 that young people were needed as recruits and guarantors of the longevity of 
the movement…. The Führer’s ambivalence toward youth helps explain why his circle of associates 
aged without younger reinforcements until the end of the Third Reich, and why the Nazi Party itself 
suffered from senescence.  
Michael H. Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 11.   
15 Ibid., 15-16. 
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possibility of eluding” it.16  Still more aggressive was the Party’s decree in March 1939, on the 
eve of the war, mandating that every person between the ages of ten and eighteen serve in the 
HJ.  Bundische Jugend, far more popular than the HJ less than a decade before, was a thing of 
the past.   
    For his part, von Schirach made no bones about the HJ’s central place in German life.  He 
recognized, as he stated, that Nazi ideals required the total cooptation of young people.  
Moreover, it wasn’t enough that non-Nazi youth associations be destroyed to make way for 
the HJ; as von Schirach explained, the individual had similarly to be destroyed.  “Thus the 
Jungvolk youngster who at the age of ten enters the movement…soon learns to subordinate 
his own petty will to the laws which have built states and made whole nations happy, but the 
violation of which results in the loss of freedom and the collapse of the Volk.”17  The logic 
was clear enough:  participation outside of the Nazi institutional landscape, which was 
necessarily an outgrowth of the Nazi Weltanschauung and whose tenets more or less precluded 
individual autonomy or identity, amounted to an attack on the Volk itself.  We will see 
presently that the Fascists in Italy used remarkably similar language to describe the intentions 
behind the Balilla and Avanguardisti.       
II. Legitimating the State-Nation  
 
     The well-worn paradox of Fascism as it emerged in interwar Europe is this:  while it was 
an essentially political project which sought, and for a limited time largely succeed in, 
institutionalizing an ideology, the content of that ideology is nearly impossible to pin down.  
                                                            
16 Dagmar Reese, “The BDM Generation: a Female Generation in Transition from Dictatorship to 
Democracy,” in Roseman, Generations in Conflict, 238. 
17 Baldur von Schirach, “The Hitler Youth,” in Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich, 
ed. George L. Mosse (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 295. 
33 
 
There were no great Fascist minds; like nationalists in general, the Fascists could never boast 
the ideological richness of, say, their Communist counterparts.  Fascism had no Marx, no 
Engels, no Lenin.18  The astonishing ideological vagueness of the Fascist program is naturally 
reflected in the oppositional stance Fascists in Italy and Germany took toward education and 
intellectualism, and indeed toward the Enlightenment generally.  When Hitler noted, 
presumably unembarrassed, “Knowledge is ruin to my young men,”19 he let the Fascist cat 
out of the bag perhaps more than he knew. 
     Still, certain Fascist tenets were more or less universal, even if the details varied from 
country to country, and these tenets were clearly evident in the ideologies taught to 
youngsters by way of the authoritarian youth group.  First and most important, the Fascist 
regimes were aggressively nationalistic and claimed legitimacy on the basis of their supposed 
representation of the masses.  These two features of Fascism, which naturally walked hand-
in-glove, rested firmly at the top of the ideological agenda in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany 
and therefore at the top of the agenda of the Fascist AYG.  It may be right, as Michael Kater 
points out, that the immediate impetus for mandating participation in the HJ, for instance, 
was the looming war,20 but viewing the Hitler Youth (or its Italian counterpart) solely as a 
repository for the military’s next crop of inductees requires that we ignore many of 
                                                            
18 I borrow this formulation in part from Anderson, who notes, “[U]nlike most other isms, nationalism has 
never produced its own grand thinkers:  no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers.” Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. Ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 5.   
19 Julius Gould, “The Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend,” The British Journal of Sociology 2, no. 4 (December 
1951): 313, http://www.jstor.org/stable/588084.   
20 As Kater writes, “With war in the offing, Hitler now thought it prudent to fashion the HJ more strictly as a 
training cadre for the Wehrmacht, and this could not be accomplished without coercion.” Kater, Hitler Youth, 
23.  See also where Kater notes that certain branches of the HJ facilitated, in large part, members’ matriculation 
into particular branches of the Wehrmacht.  As he notes, members of the Fliers HJ were to become Luftwaffe 
pilots; members of Marine HJ, naturally popular in northern Germany, could transition with similar ease into 
the Navy; members of Equestrian HJ and Communications HJ had a place among the ground forces. Kater, 
Hitler Youth, 32.  
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organization’s most important activities.  Ultimately, acquiring ideological resources, rather 
than merely ensuring coercive might, was at the core of the HJ’s goals, and among its most 
important ideological tasks was to legitimate the state-nation, the heart and indeed the raison 
d’être of Fascism. 
     Some of the HJ’s activities produced ideological effects as well as a more immediate 
service to the state, while other activities were more purely ideological.  Athletics, for 
example, over which the HJ took total control in 1933, provided ideological as well as pre-
military training.21  On the ideological front, the Fascist AYG tended to use sports, in part, 
to quell whatever sense of individualism a young German or Italian might have felt so that 
his group, and ultimately his nation, would come to be his ultimate concern.  In addition, at 
the same time, organized sports reflected the Fascist cacoëthes for physical perfection.  
According to the Fascists themselves, sports in Italy were meant to teach youngsters “the 
sense of strength and of beauty” and to show them that “a healthy intellectual life” was 
contingent upon “a healthy and robust body.”22  Like their German counterparts, the Italians 
were particularly fond of gymnastic exercises, which they consciously used as a means by 
which to diminish the individual and to promote in his stead passion for the group and its 
goals.23   
Further, and perhaps more specifically, in Fascist Italy, the future of youngsters’ physical 
health was entrusted only to those who had managed to endure years of training in AYG.  
Only students at the Fascist Academy, who had chosen from the ranks of the Fascist Party 
                                                            
21 See especially ibid., 30-31. 
22 Quoted in Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 430. 
23 Ibid. 
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(and who, before that, had of course been members of the Avanguardisti) could secure 
“appointments as physical-education instructors in the public schools.”24  As P.W.L. Cox put 
it in the middle-1930s, these well-bred pedagogues “are expected to be the future functional 
leaders of Italian youth and their parents, and to affect the habits of life and patterns of 
thought of the Italian people permanently for the safety and imperial welfare of the nation, 
and especially for the acceptance of hierarchy and discipline in accordance with the basic 
principle of Fascismo.”25  Here we clearly see the intimate connection between the 
legitimation of the state and its values and the production of its future elites,26 to which we 
will turn below.             
     In general, certainly beyond the athletic field, the desire to be the same as their peers—or, 
maybe more accurately, the fear of sticking out among them—motivated many young people 
to join the Italian AYG.  “[C]hildren join because others join….  It is not so much that they 
want to be the same as others,” Finer observed, “as that they do not wish to be different.”27  
This homogenization clearly subjugated the individual and empowered the group, and in this 
way helped habituate youngsters to the nationalist ethos. 
     Even the word “Balilla,” the name of the Italian AYG for children aged eight to fourteen, 
was intended to strike a nationalist chord.   “Balilla” was the appellation of an eighteenth-
century boy in Genoa, Giovanni Batista Perasso, who, according to legend, commenced a 
revolt in 1746 against the invading Austrian forces.28  Never mind that in 1746 Genoa had 
                                                            
24 For the description, see Cox, “Opera Nazionale Balilla,” 269-270; the quotation comes from 270. 
25 Ibid., 270. 
26 See ibid., where Cox notes that the Balilla organization “may serve as a model and a guide for ‘elites’ in other 
countries.” 
27 Ibid.   
28 Cox, “Opera Nazionale Balilla,” 268; see also Finer, Musslini’s Italy, 437. 
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little do with Rome or “Italy,” whose unification was still more than a century away; in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the point, clearly enough, was that Giovanni had braved 
the Austrian invaders for the good of the fatherland.29  Significantly, Giovanni had a rough 
German equivalent in one Herbert Norkus, a Weimar-era member of the HJ who achieved 
martyrdom upon his murder by Communists in 1932.  Norkus thus became the great boy 
hero of the Hitler Youth.  This was indicated, for example, by the film Hitlerjunge Quex, in 
which Norkus was eulogized and lionized for mass youth consumption.30   
     Adherence to and participation in groups tend, as a matter of course, to diminish 
individualism, but the Fascists, as we might expect, ratcheted up this natural process with 
peculiar resolve and temerity.  Again, the subjugation of the individual to the nation, which 
was supposed to find its institutional voice in the state alone, was of the essence.  Consider, 
for instance, the addendum to the Fascist Oath given to Balilla members.  The little Black 
Shirt was instructed that he “no longer belongs to himself but to the Duce and to the cause 
of the Revolution, even as, for the Duce and the Revolution, died the three thousand Fascist 
Martyrs.”31  Members of the Avanguardisti, only slightly older than their Balilla brethren, 
were given an even more elaborate addendum informing them that their devotion to the 
state-nation was to be for life.32  In addition, every year, Avanguardisti members had the 
opportunity to stay for a week at Camp Dux in Rome, where  
they engage for in military and athletic activities and competitions and visit the 
monuments and other places of interest of the Eternal City—the Imperial City of 
Destiny.  Here they meet Il Duce, dignified, friendly, but a bit aloof.  They pledge to 
                                                            
29 On the latter point, see Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 437. 
30 See Kater, Hitler Youth, 18-19 and 33. 
31 Quoted in Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 441. 
32 Ibid. 
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him and to Fascismo and to Italy their fealty.  Here they are led to exalt the spirit of 
coöperation, subordination of self to group, athletic and military competence not for 
vainglory but for the welfare of Italy—calling for all-around abilities rather than 
specialized training.  All is carefully staged; enthusiasm runs high; and atmosphere of 
religious devotion to the revolution prevails.33 
 
In Chapter IV, in which we turn to the contemporary Russian AYG Nashi, the reader may 
note some degree of similarity between Camp Dux and the Nashi camp at Lake Seliger. 
     As in the Italian case, some HJ activities were, if tangentially related to the war’s military 
goals, animated almost exclusively by ideological goals.  The agricultural branch of the Hitler 
Youth, HJ-Landdienst, is exemplary.  At least on its face, the group’s origins were relatively 
innocent:  members were assigned to rural farms where they were supposed to help peasants 
with their labors.34  But a funny thing happened on the way to world domination.  After the 
beginning of the war, the Nazis commenced to transport these youngsters en masse to 
recently-acquired territories, first in Poland and soon thereafter in Austria, Belgium, and 
France (Alsace-Lorraine), where they were instructed to indoctrinate the so-called 
Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans living outside the German borders.  The Volksdeutsche were to 
be taught proper German (as determined by the Nazis), as well as Nazi culture.  In 1942, 
participation in this part of the Hitler Youth was made compulsory.35 
                                                            
33 Cox, “Opera Nazionale Balilla,” 269. Emphasis in original. 
34 However, even this was more sinister than it may at first appear.  As Kater explains,  
From the beginning of organized agricultural service, around 1934, the Nazis targeted eastern 
territories in particular, first German ones adjoining the Polish border such as Pomerania and Silesia, 
with a view to occupying them in a sweep of conquest behind the German Wehrmacht.  Thus helping 
on farms and in the fields…was complementary  to the barely disguised imperialistic hikes by Hitler 
Youths to the coveted borders.  When the time came, these youths would know those territories and 
how to exploit them….  [The project] was based on that of the racist Artamanen, a pre-1933 youth 
league on the extreme right of would-be eastern settlers, to which leading National Socialists had once 
belonged….. 
Kater, Hitler Youth, 34.  
35 Ibid., 34-35. 
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     Why undertake such a project? Obviously, as a practical matter, this endeavor to inure the 
Volksdeutsche to the Third Reich would have been impossible if the German military had 
failed to seize territory beyond its 1939 borders.  But no military objective was served by this 
project; the attempt to inculcate systematically a foreign population (and indeed the 
Volksdeutsche were, notwithstanding nationalist claims, foreigners) was an entirely elective 
policy by the Nazis.  Plenty of modern states, like their premodern antecedents, had 
conquered vast territories without ever undertaking to integrate whole populations into this 
or that culture.  It is entirely conceivable that the Nazis could have overtaken the 
borderlands without bothering with ideological proselytization of ethnic Germans or any 
other group.  Thus, especially in its wartime function, the HJ-Landdienst demonstrates that 
currying ideological power, not least in order to legitimate the hegemonic state-nation, was at 
the top of the agenda for the Hitler Youth. 
     To be sure, especially in the German case but also in Fascist Italy, nationalism was 
inseparable from racism.  In these cases, nation was race and race was nation, and thus, in 
general, expressions of nationalism by Fascist AYG tended to be racist as a matter of course.  
The Nazi case alone offers innumerable demonstrative examples.  Consider, for instance, 
one of the various nationalist-racist projects carried out by the girls and young women in the 
Bund Deutscher Mädel, the female branch of the HJ which had emerged in 1930 and by 1931 
had absorbed the various other Nazi women’s groups.36  Following the Nazi seizure of 
Poland, the Third Reich resolved to distinguish the ethnic Germans living in Poland (who 
were therefore part of the Volksdeutsche) from the ethnic Poles.  The ethnic Poles would then 
                                                            
36 Ibid., 77. 
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be transferred out of the Wartheland region, which the Germans had conveniently 
determined was German territory.  This would free the Wartheland of Poles and therefore 
affect to “purify” the German nation-race.  The plan was carried out with impunity:  a 
staggering one million ethnic Poles were ripped out of their homes and forced to relocate to 
other parts of Poland.  For its part, the BDM proved indispensable.  Thousands of BDM 
girls (19,000), along with their leaders, were shipped to 160 camps, where they lived for 
several weeks, helping the ethnic Germans move in to their new homes whilst being 
indoctrinated with—what else?—the racist orthodoxy of the Nazi Party.  The historical 
record indicates that these girls were constantly told of Poles’ racial inferiority (and, naturally 
enough, came as a result to be despised by the native Poles).37  In the same way that the Nazi 
state refused to relinquish its radical ideological objectives, even as war raged, neither would 
the HJ give up its commitment to nationalist proselytism.     
III. The Family, Gender, and Sex(uality) 
 
     Like Soviet Communism, to which we will turn in the next chapter, Fascism in Italy and 
Germany promoted puritanical mores with regard to gender and sex, at least on the surface.  
In truth, by a paradox, these regimes held up the family as a basic and inviolable social unit 
while seeking at the same time to weaken the family relative to the state and, in particular, to 
separate children from their parents.  In pursuing these ends, AYG were often crucial. 
A. Gender and Reproduction 
    In general, women were not considered equal to men in Nazi Germany, although it would 
be incorrect to argue that women were neglected by Nazi ideological planners.  Quite on the 
contrary, women in the Third Reich were burdened not merely with rearing the next 
                                                            
37 Ibid., 88-91. 
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generation of Germans but with doing so in accordance with Nazi eugenics.  Because of the 
centrality of “race theory” in Nazi ideology, sexual reproduction was viewed not just as a 
matter of maintaining the German population (which went without saying), but also, and 
more profoundly, as the essential task of producing little Aryans.  In this sense, women were 
instrumentalized by the state explicitly for their capacity to reproduce.  This led to a host of 
state measures, some related directly to the Hitler Youth.  For example, in 1932, on the eve 
of his ascension, Hitler himself expressed great interest in the uniforms worn by HJ girls, 
which had to be attractive, he explained, presumably in order to attract men.  Ensuring girls’ 
attractiveness would remain a major goal of the BDM for its whole existence.38        
     But the state’s efforts to prepare the young women of the BDM, who were aged ten to 
eighteen, to be mothers surely did not end with uniforms.  As Kater points out, noting the 
somewhat more “feminine” posture taken toward the BDM girls (compared to the more 
militaristic posture toward the boys), the BDM tried “to emphasize the ideal of physical 
passivity…and lack of activism, which were commensurate with the hoped-for future 
eugenic role of girls as Nazi childbearers.”39  This biological intention was evident in a variety 
of ways, such as athletics.  For girls, “rhythmical gymnastics took the place of athletic strain.”  
Meanwhile, for their BDM overseers, “the flow of gymnastic movements was closely related 
to the feminine anatomy and the future role of women as” mothers.  “Where boys had to be 
forceful, girls had to show grace.”40  Even from our temporal remove, it is easy to imagine 
the alienation that would have befallen the little girl who failed to aspire to motherhood.  In 
                                                            
38 Ibid., 78 and 82-83. 
39 Ibid., 80. 
40 Ibid., 82. 
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1936, Hitler announced that “woman’s supreme function” was to become a mother, and 
preferably one with “several children.”41  Heinrich Himmler put out a “Procreation Order” 
which stated that promotions in the SS would be granted exclusively to married officers with 
(hopefully male) children.42      
     As Kater points out, the BDM was not, in general, an explicitly political organization—
except when it came to race, the Nazi state’s central focus.  As we started to see in the 
previous section, in matters of racist orthodoxy, the BDM girls were consistently well-
schooled.43  BDM members went to talks entitled, for instance, “Race and Volk,” and heard, 
as all Germans did, about Jews’ infiltration into Germany and the various nefarious 
influences the Jewish people had brought to the Fatherland.  In Nazi Germany, of course, 
antisemitism wore many guises and took many forms, and certainly one form was gendered.  
“The Nazi stereotypes of Jews abounded and were conspicuously directed at the core of 
German womanhood,” writes Kater.44  Among the most pervasive antisemitic lies peddled 
by the Nazi state insisted that Jewish men were sexual deviants who could not be trusted 
around German women.  For example, the 1940 propaganda film Jud Süß, which told the 
unhappy story of a German girl’s rape by a Jewish man, made its rounds among German 
youngsters.45   
     Italian women were consigned to similar domesticity, and again the importance of 
reproduction (though with less emphasis on eugenics) was emphasized.  The Italian Fascists 
also made no bones about mothers’ ideological function.  According to one state document, 
                                                            
41 Quoted in ibid., 83. 
42 Ibid., 97. 
43 See Kater’s excellent summary, ibid., 99. 
44 Ibid., 100. 
45 Ibid., 101. 
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the ideal donna fascista was to be a mother and “a perfect mistress of the home, not only in 
the practical activities of everyday life, but also in the affirmation of a spirit profoundly 
Fascist,” presumably not least in order to acclimatize her children to the Fascist teachings to 
which they would be exposed at school and in the Balilla.  In addition, the Italian woman 
was to help younger females achieve “charm and beauty” (recall Hitler’s interest in girls’ 
uniforms), and to promote motherhood:  according to the document, a woman’s 
“regenerative powers” were essential “to the progress of the family, and thereby to the 
strengthening of the nation in the spiritual atmosphere”—that is, the dogmatic cultural-
ideological universe—“of the régime.”46  This document demonstrates clearly that the 
legitimation of the state was not considered distinct from, but in fact intimately tied up with, 
the state’s familial and reproductive objectives.   
     Meanwhile, non-procreative sex was clearly to be avoided, and certainly there was no 
room—not least among young people—for homosexual behavior.  Nazi courts prosecuted 
and convicted approximately 50,000 men for homosexual behavior, sending some to 
concentration camps and castrating others.47  Certainly homosexuality among NSDAP 
members was taken particularly seriously by the Party, especially after the “Night of the 
Long Knives” in 1934, in which SA Chief of Staff Ernst Röhm was ostensibly (although 
probably not really) “liquidated” at least in part because he was gay.48  Thereafter, 
homosexuality was regarded as a danger to Germany and to the Nazi Party, and to the Hitler 
                                                            
46 Quoted in Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 444. 
47 See, e.g., Harry Oosterhuis, “Medicine, Male Bonding and Homosexuality in Nazi Germany,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 32, no. 2 (April 1997): 188, 189, 191, http://www.jstor.org/stable/261240.  
48 While it is true that the Nazis claimed that Röhm was “liquidated” in 1934 (along with other gay SA 
members) at least in part as a result of his homosexuality, in truth the purge probably had little to do with 
sexuality and was instead a result of political considerations. Ibid., 189. 
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Jugend maybe most of all.  Thus, for instance, in addition to other members of the Party and 
individuals in the army, certain members of the HJ were forced to undergo treatment at the 
Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy, where their putative disorder was 
supposed to be remedied.  Astonishingly, as late as 1943, almost a full decade after Röhm’s 
removal (and at a time when the German state seemingly had bigger fish to fry), the Reich 
Working Group for Youth (Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Jugendbetreuung) dispatched a directive to 
the HJ entitled, “Special Measures Combating Same-Sex Acts.”49  
     Well before 1943, however, and indeed before the war had commenced, Himmler had 
announced his fear that the boys in the HJ (and the SS) promoted homosexuality.  
According to Himmler, what these boys needed was more time with women.  In the words 
of one historian, Himmler feared “the too-powerful masculinization and militarization” of 
Nazism, “in which the male youth had too little opportunity to associate with the other sex 
in a relaxed atmosphere.”  In light of this unfortunately reality, said Himmler, “the [Nazi] 
movement facilitated homosexuality, since under these circumstances masturbation circles 
and sexually tinged friendships could quickly spring up among youths.” 50  Himmler 
neglected to divulge whether he spoke from experience.   
     Female sexuality seems to have provoked far less interest among Nazi officials than male 
sexuality, although women’s sexual interests were not totally ignored.  Hitler, for example, 
was held up by the state as a sexual icon that women were meant to worship.  “Hitler exuded 
                                                            
49 In the document, homosexuality was portrayed as rampant and dangerous.  As one historian writes, the 
NSDAP “regarded all German males as susceptible to homosexual seduction to such a powerful degree.  In 
fact, the consideration forced itself on them again and again that their own movement, which was based on 
male bonding, might evoke homosexuality, and that, as a fertile soil for a secret state within the state, it could 
undermine the National Socialist movement from the inside out.” Ibid., 195-196.   
50 Ibid., 201. 
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a sexual magnetism for German females which today can only be compared with the mass 
appeal of an international rock star.”51  Moreover, as Kater points out, the paternality with 
which the group manifestly imbued Hitler was, when considered along Freudian lines, sexual 
in the extreme.  Certainly members of the BDM were highly sexualized.  Hundreds of girls, 
for example, left the famous Nazi rally in Nuremburg in 1936 pregnant, while only about 
one of every two knew the identity of the father.  In addition, over time and surely once the 
war was underway, Germans parodied the “BDM” acronym, insisting that it actually referred 
to “Bund Deutscher Matratzen” or “Bubi Drück Mich,” that is, “League of German Mattresses” 
or “Come on Boy, Press Me Hard,” respectively.52  Needless to say, such overt male 
chauvinism and coarse sexualization accorded less than ideally with the gender conventions 
eagerly promoted by Nazi propaganda. 
B. Parents and Children 
     Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany therefore encouraged men and women to procreate.  
This had various implications, some of which clearly related to these states’ AYG.  Once 
their children had been born, however, Mother and Father had, if not completed their duty, 
completed the bulk of it.  Certainly in the German case, the state derived its power in very 
large part from the separation it sought to affect between children and their parents.  The 
Nazis could scarcely admit this objective, in part because of its obvious potential to alienate 
parents.  But the Nazis knew that familial autonomy and cohesion had to be broken down 
                                                            
51 Kater continues, 
Hitler understood his intense appeal to women and used it strategically.  His rationale for remaining a 
bachelor…was that of a seasoned demagogue:  if he were married, he would be seen as having been 
spoken for and would lose the support of many German girls and women.  He wanted to be indelibly 
imprinted in their hearts as an eligible bachelor and potential spouse.  Not unlike a nun’s marriage to 
Christ, the female Aryan would always be joined to her Fuhrer. 
Kater, Hitler Youth, 105. 
52 Ibid., 105 and 108. 
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wherever it existed, just like the private sphere in general had to be broken down.  As Harry 
Oosterhuis writes, “[a]lthough the authority of the father and the role of the mother were 
propagandized, the upbringing of youth, especially boys, was largely taken away from 
parents.”   
     To some degree, the wedge driven between parents and kids was a direct result of the fact 
that participation in the HJ demanded that its members spend an enormous amount of time 
outside of the home.  Service in the Hitler Jugend “did take boys away from home, and if 
parents objected, in practice it was the family who lost out and not the organization.”53  
Certainly this was true by November 1942, when, for the first time, the state’s major organs 
of domestic coercion could enforce HJ membership, issuing fines to parents as well as 
youngsters whose participation was found to be lacking.  Parents and young people could 
even be imprisoned on the basis of nonparticipation.54  These measures alone surely went a 
long way in distancing kids from their parents, geographically, certainly, but also 
ideologically.  There were, however, other, more blatant aspects of HJ participation which 
manifestly pushed families apart, effectively reassigning the duties of childrearing to the 
state.  Many parents, whether supportive Nazis or not, had much to fear in their youngsters.  
One man, for example, reportedly called Hitler “a blood-crazed maniac,” only to be ratted 
out to the authorities by his son, an HJ member, and shipped off to his death at Dachau.  In 
addition, male as well as female HJ leaders are known to have targeted the parents of their 
                                                            
53 Oosterhuis continues:  “The same held for men in the army and other semi-military organizations like the SS 
and the SA.  Close emotional ties with the family did not fit in with the role which the male in close alliance 
with other men was obliged to fulfil [sic] in nazi [sic] Germany.” Oosterhuis, “Medicine,” 199. 
54Kater, Hitler Youth, 26-27. 
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charges.55  For these young people, as for so many others, the ideology of the Hitler Youth 
overcame whatever loyalty to their parents they might once have felt.   
     In addition, beyond actual cases of children betraying their parents was, as one would 
predict, the fear of such betrayal.  The playwright Bertolt Brecht shined light on fear of this 
sort (and its likely origins in the HJ) in “The Spy,” one scene in his Fear and Misery of the Third 
Reich.  In the scene, a mother and father sit nervously at home on a rainy day worrying that 
their son, a member of the Hitler Youth called Klaus-Heinrich, will rat them out to the 
authorities.  The father character has made several remarks criticizing Hitler and the Nazis in 
the presence of Klaus-Heinrich, who has just run off, ostensibly to buy sweets.  Is he actually 
buying sweets, his parents wonder, or has he gone to betray them?  “They’ve something 
against everyone,” the father says of young people.  “Everyone’s suspect.  Once the 
suspicion’s there, one’s suspect.”56  As we saw at some length in the previous chapter, 
Orwell would take up this theme in 1984, showcasing with particular acumen and verve the 
nexus between children, family, and sex in the authoritarian state.57  
     Various other efforts similarly militated against the autonomous, cohesive family by 
throwing up barriers between children and their parents.  Consider, for example, the 
Kinderlandverschickung program, established in 1940 for children as young as four and as old as 
teenaged.  The program relocated urban kids for as long as six months to rural areas, in 
Germany and beyond, ostensibly in order to protect them from Allied bombs.  Children 
                                                            
55 Ibid., 38-39. 
56 Bertolt Brecht, Fear and Misery of the Third Reich, in Bertolt Brecht Collected Plays, vol. 4, bk. 3, Bertolt Brecht: Plays, 
Poetry and Prose, eds. John Willett and Ralph Manheim, trans. John Willett (London: Methuen, 1979), 59; see in 
general 53-62. 
57 See, in addition, Alexander von Plato, “The Hitler Youth Generation and its Role in the Two Post-War 
German States,” in Roseman, Generations in Conflict, 214-216. 
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between the ages of four- and ten-years were put up with families, while older kids went to 
HJ homes under the care of older HJ members.  By 1945, a remarkable five million German 
kids had been relocated to 12,000 locations.58  Parents were permitted to visit their kids 
(although it was suggested by the HJ that they refrain from doing so), and although parents 
and children could correspond by post, children’s letters naturally arrived at the censor’s 
desk before being forwarded to their intended destination.59 
     What ideological objective might this program, tied up immutably with Nazi AYG, have 
pursued?  According to Kater, the Nazi state “purposely planted their youth”—again, under 
the auspices of protecting them from bombs—“in surroundings known to be hostile to 
them.”  Why?  As Kater notes, 
This afforded the HJ ample opportunity to point out the difference between HJ 
children as heirs of the master race on the one side, and those slaves who had already 
been vanquished, on the other.  This was not without danger to the youngsters, who 
in Occupied Poland and the Protectorate in particular were always regarded with 
unmitigated hostility in the streets, to the point where it was dangerous for them to 
be alone or in small groups without the protection of firearms held at the ready by 
accompanying senior Hitler Youths.  Children were being taught to hate in the field, 
as it were; they would have to use this skill later at the extended fronts, to defend 
their status as members to the German rural caste.60 
      
On the one hand, the program separated children from their parents and, in the process, 
effectively cast the state as youngsters’ ultimate protector.  At the same time, on the other 
hand, like the Nazi posture toward women and reproduction, it promoted the diffusion of 
                                                            
58 Kater, Hitler Youth, 44-45. 
59 It should be pointed out that these kids could, under some circumstances, go home:  “[T]he regulations 
were…on the parents’ side; so if they really wanted to have their children back home, there was nothing that 
could be done to stop them.  Usually it was sufficient for children to convince the HJ or their parents that they 
were quite ill, so that they could be brought home.” Ibid., 46. 
60 Ibid., 48. 
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Nazi nationalist mythology and emphasized in particular the supposed homogeneity of the 
German race-nation.     
IV.  Ensuring the Fascist Future 
 
     In 1934, Adolf Hitler stood before some sixty-thousand HJ members and assured them 
of their power, not only in the new Third Reich as it then existed, but also as it would exist 
in the future.  The Führer’s words that day were uncharacteristically rich.  “Twelve months 
ago, the struggle for power granted us success,” he said.  “And since then our movement, 
whose young vanguard you are and whose standard bearers you will be, has repossessed one 
position after the other in this state….”61  These young people were not merely favored by 
the new Nazi regime, Hitler said; they were the Nazi regime, its “young vanguard” and its 
future leaders.  In addition to making absurd use of the “movement” trope, hinting at its 
effectiveness, Hitler handed over to his young audience nothing less than the future of 
Nazism.  It is illuminating that the abovementioned film, a hagiography of the boy martyr 
Herbert Norkus called Hitlerjunge Quex, featured a song (“Our Flag Is Showing Us the Way”) 
in which young people were labeled, with typical heavy-handedness, “the soldiers of the 
future.”62   
     As we saw in the previous chapter, in general, authoritarian youth groups are meant to be 
both formative and productive.  They are formative in that they are meant to impress upon 
young people particular beliefs, convictions, and values and, in so doing, to mold them into 
loyal and supportive subjects.  They are also productive, in the sense that they are intended to 
produce a cadre of state bureaucrats and leaders for the future.  Thus, in Nazi Germany, the 
                                                            
61 Quoted in ibid., 68.   
62 Quoted in ibid., 33. 
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Hitler Youth played an essential role in the future that the Nazis envisaged, “in which many 
ruthless political fuhrers were needed for every government echelon.”63  In the same way, 
indeed, little Mussolinis were needed in Italy.  As the Duce declared at the Young Fascist 
Congress in Rome in 1931, his young Black Shirts were “warriors in a great army, bearers 
and transmitters of a consecrate faith which finds in the young, the guarantee of its 
development and its permanence!”64  Mussolini’s Secretary of the Party, Achille Starace, had 
been even more explicit in 1930, when he wrote that with the Balilla and Avanguardisti the 
state “intend[ed] to prepare spiritually”—by which he manifestly meant ideologically—“all 
the youth of Italy, from whom…there must issue the ranks of the governing classes of Italy 
of to-morrow….”  As he added:  “The totalitarian principle of the education of 
youth…responds to this supreme necessity of the Fascist revolution which intends to last, 
that is to say, exist continuously into the future.”  Starace insisted on the necessity of 
youngsters’ self-sacrifice and emphasized their essential role as “the continuers in spirit and 
form of the Revolution of October 1922, a Revolution still in its ascending movement, 
because many its aims are yet to be attained.”65  With this remark, he not only gave to youth 
responsibility for the Fascist future, but also reiterated the state’s nationalist mythology, 
which young people were of course to uphold not only in their youth but as adults. 
V. Conclusions 
      
     As many have pointed out, the Fascists, like the Soviet Communists, essentially 
conducted an experiment:  they sought to remake the world in their own image, starting at 
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64 Quoted in Finer, Mussolini’s Italy, 414. 
65 Quoted in ibid., 416. 
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home, and they knew they would need youth on their side if their dreams were to come to 
fruition.  But if the Communists had the inevitability of history’s progression on their side, 
the Fascists had to work for the future:  to produce, through their inculcation of youngsters, 
the future they imagined.  This is what they set out to do, and this is why the great Fascist 
dictatorships of twentieth-century Europe tested youngsters’ utility to their cause to a greater 
extent than any other. 
     As we began to see in theoretical terms in the previous chapter, ideology or, more 
accurately, ideological power, is one of the three major “power resources” for which actors 
compete in politics.  All states, democracies and non-democracies alike, seek ideological 
resources, but only authoritarian states demand ideological hegemony.  This implies, of 
necessity, a showdown between state and society.  Whereas all states monopolize coercion, 
as we know from Weber, ideological resources are by definition more diffuse in liberal 
contexts than in illiberal ones.  The liberal state seeks ideological power, but it also protects a 
host of freedoms which militate against any single actor achieving ideological monopoly.  By 
contrast, the authoritarian state seeks total ideological control, and the authoritarian youth 
group is one important tool (although by no means the only tool) with which authoritarian 
states seek to gain the ideological upper-hand among young people.  AYG are instruments 
of ideological cooptation and are meant to suppress, rather than to augment or even to exist 
alongside, civil society.  In this chapter, I have endeavored to show (a) the high degree to 
which the Fascists of the interwar period felt compelled to coopt youth, and (b) how they 
used authoritarian youth groups in an effort to achieve certain ideological goals.  In general, 
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these goals fall under one (or more) of the four broad categories described in the previous 
chapter.     
     Certainly in building the Hitler Youth, the Nazis did not start from scratch.  As one 
scholar has pointed out, in the pre-Nazi Weimar era, youth activism was relatively common.  
“Never before had German youth formed so many organizations, each of which combined 
comradeship among members with intense hatred of opponents.”66  Unlike the failed 
Weimar government, however, the Nazi leadership that assumed power in 1933 refused to 
share ideological power.  As we have seen, neither Hitler nor his Fascist confreres in Italy 
would stand for ideological competition.  In the next chapters, we will see that, far from 
uniquely Fascist, this attempt to drown out ideological competitors, is a characteristic par 
excellence of authoritarian states.  In addition, we will see that the ideological objectives 
which animated the Balilla, the Avanguardisti, and the Hitler Jugend are remarkably similar 
to those pursued by the Communists, and even by today’s Kremlin.  
 
 
      
 
      
 
                                                            
66 Herbert Moller, “Youth as a Force in the Modern World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 10, no. 3 
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Chapter III:  The Pied Piper Wears Red:  Communist AYG  
“We always mean to remain the Party for the youth of that class to which the future 
belongs.” 
—Vladimir Il’yich Lenin1 
 
I. Introduction:  Historical Origins of the Communist AYG 
 
     No less than their Fascist counterparts, the major Communist states of the twentieth 
century recognized the power of young people early on and attempted consequently to 
exploit that power in pursuit of their own ends.  Also like the Fascists, the Communists 
meant not only to indoctrinate young people, leading them by their ears into the ideological 
fold, but also, with some notable exception, to drown out potential competitors.2  This 
chapter shines light on the Communist AYG, especially the Soviet All-Union Leninist 
Communist Union of Youth (VLKSM, or Komsomol).  Attention is also given to China’s 
Communist Youth League (CYL), although, as we will see, the Chinese case constitutes an 
outlier in this study for several reasons.  
     Unlike Hitler, who, as we saw in the preceding chapter, came to recognize the immediate 
utility of his young supporters only in the early 1930s, the Russian Communists were aware 
                                                            
1 Quoted in Merle Fainsod, “The Komsomols—A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship,” The American Political 
Science Review 45, no. 1 (March 1951): 19, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950882.   
2 Of course, the Communists sought ideological hegemony not only among youngsters, but among all 
populations and indeed within all spheres of life.  As Gabriel A. Almond noted in the 1980s, the Communists 
tended to worry in particular about non-state voices influencing their subjects:     
Marxist-Leninist theory has well-articulated views on the agents and the processes of political 
socialization.  All the agents of socialization treated in the Western socialization literature are to be 
found in the socialist literature.  Family, church, school, work place, interest group, political party, the 
media of communication, local government, and government output and performance are all 
recognized as having some impact on political attitudes and culture.  The principal distinction made in 
Leninist theory is between those agents of socialization that foster traditional patterns of political 
culture and those that foster rational and appropriate ones.  Families, religious bodies, ethnic 
communities, professional groups, and face-to-face communication media outside the Communist 
party and related organizations tend to foster residual cultural tendencies, whereas schools, the 
Communist party and related organizations, and the mass media of communication are the principal 
agents of appropriate political socialization. 
Gabriel A. Almond, “Communism and Political Culture Theory,” Comparative Politics 15, no. 2 (Jan. 1983):  131, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/421672. 
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of youngsters’ significance to their cause well in advance of the Komsomol’s emergence and 
consolidation and indeed in advance of the Revolution of 1917.  But what began as a mere 
ally of the Bol’sheviks in 1918, the year of the Komsomol’s debut Congress in Moscow, 
quickly became a full-fledged arm of the Soviet state.  Thereafter, the state made short work 
of alternative, i.e., non-state, youth associations:  between 1922 and 1926 all of the 
Komsomol’s competitors were banned in the USSR.  As one scholar noted in 1951, “[t]he 
thirty-four years of the Soviet Youth Movement’s history have mirrored the transformation 
of the Bolshevik Party from a revolutionary conspiracy into a State Party wielding State-
power.”3  We will see in this chapter that, particularly after 1936, ideology was squarely at the 
top of the Komsomol agenda.  
     Three authoritarian youth groups existed in the Soviet Union:  the Little Octobrists, for 
children between the ages of seven and ten; the Young Pioneers, for children and 
adolescents between ten and fourteen; and the Komsomol, for adolescents and young adults 
between fourteen and twenty-eight.  The AYG of early Communist China followed this 
model closely:  the membership of the Young Pioneers was made up of children between the 
ages of nine and fifteen, while Chinese between fifteen and twenty-five were eligible for the 
CYL.  Both the Komsomol in the Soviet Union and the CYL in early Communist China 
were tasked with overseeing the Pioneers.4  Also in both cases, the Pioneers were intended to 
prepare members for participation in the Komsomol and the CYL.5  As one historian notes 
                                                            
3 Julius Gould, “The Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend,” The British Journal of Sociology 2, no. 4 (December 1951): 
306, http://www.jstor.org/stable/588084.  
4 On the Soviet case, see Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 22 and especially 33; on the Chinese case, see especially 
Victor C. Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, 1949-1966,” The China Quarterly, no. 42 (April-
June 1970): 125-126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/6520333. 
5 On the Soviet case, see Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 22; on the Chinese case, see Funnell, “The Chinese 
Communist Youth Movement,” 124. 
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of the Chinese Pioneers:  “If the League was a ‘school for the study of Communism,’ then 
the Pioneers were the kindergarten.”6        
     In the Soviet Union, the VLKSM was not established until after the Revolution of 1917.  
Prior to that, like the Hitler Youth, which in the last days of the Weimar era was far from 
Germany’s only youth association (and was in fact far from its most popular youth 
association), the Bol’sheviks faced stiff competition in their quest to win the loyalties of 
young people.  Before the Revolution, the Bol’sheviks tended to gain new supporters by 
infiltrating extant youth associations—that is, non-Bol’shevik youth associations—and 
convincing their members to join the ranks of the Bol’sheviks.7  The Komsomol finally arose 
in the fall of 1918, although still at that point it considered itself separate from the 
Communist Party.  It took war, predictably enough, to change that:  as one scholar notes, the 
“autonomy” that had characterized the organization in its original incarnation simply could 
not “last long under Civil War conditions.”8   
                                                            
6 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 124. 
7 In a noteworthy episode, for instance, Bol’shevik operatives were tasked with infiltrating meetings of Work 
and Light, a Petrograd group for proletariat youth, specifically “with the objective of attacking its program, 
winning support for their own views, discrediting” its founder, “and eventually taking over the direction of the 
young workers themselves.”  Work and Light collapsed in August and the Bol’shevik-affiliated organization, 
the Socialist Association for Young Workers, took its place.  Fainsod writes,  
In Moscow and other large industrial centers, organizations of young workers developed more slowly 
though the same process of Bolshevik penetration and capture of leadership repeated itself.  By 
identifying themselves with the specific economic grievances of the young workers and calling for 
such popular reforms as the outlaw of child labor, the six-hour working day for young workers, the 
establishment of minimum wages, the provision of social insurance benefits, compulsory education 
free of charge until the age of sixteen, and the right to vote at the age of eighteen, the Bolsheviks 
succeeded in mobilizing considerable support among the more politically active working class youths 
in the large cities and, indeed, relied heavily on such support in their successful bid for power in 
November, 1917. 
Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 20-21. 
8 Jim Riordan, “The Komsomol,” in Soviet Youth Culture, ed. Jim Riordan (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1989), 17.   
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     Like its Soviet forebear, the Communist Party of China (CCP) also had a youth wing (or 
wings) prior to its seizure of power in 1949.9  In April of that year, the New Democratic 
Youth League was created, and was subsequently renamed the Communist Youth League in 
the middle-1950s.10  In its origins and its early history, the CYL has much in common with 
the Soviet Komsomol.  Nonetheless, the Chinese case ultimately presents an outlier, not 
only with regard to the Soviet AYG, but also, and perhaps more importantly, with regard to 
AYG in general.  There is no question but that the chief objective of Communist China’s 
AYG is to curry ideological power vis-à-vis young Chinese.  But in the late 1960s, the CYL 
met an impasse in the form of the Cultural Revolution (CR), which has no parallel in the 
Soviet case.  In fact, for more than ten years after the CR began in 1966, the CYL ceased to 
exist at all.  Moreover, in the same way that the Chinese state has gradually permitted an 
increasing degree of private enterprise to develop (and has in this way loosened its ties to 
socialist ideology), challenges of various sorts to the ideological hegemony of the CYL have 
been permitted over time, weakening the power of the organization ipso facto. 
     Upon its initiation nearly two decades after the Revolution of 1949, the CR was generally 
recognized as significant by Chinese youngsters, but their responses to it varied greatly.  
While to some it seemed to afford “a chance to accumulate political capital,” others used it 
as an excuse to rebel against authority in a variety of ways.  It was this rebellion, whose most 
vociferous manifestation was the infamous Red Guard movement, which ultimately affected 
the undoing of the Communist Youth League.  The Red Guards emerged in 1966 in the 
                                                            
9 As one historian writes, “The Communist Youth League from 1925-37, the National Salvation Youth 
Association and the Anti-Japanese Youth Vanguards in the wartime period of 1937-45, and the League of 
Democratic Youth and the New Democratic Youth Alliance in the years 1946-49 provided a broad front for 
the enlistment of youth in the Party’s cause, with their names reflecting the changes in Party tactics at different 
periods of its history.” Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 113.  
10 See ibid., 113 and 114. 
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service, they said, of Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Thought, and the Communist Party, and 
certainly, at least initially, Chairman Mao stood behind them.  The rebels’ numbers and 
infrastructure expanded and strengthened with remarkable rapidity,11 and their extraordinary 
energy and force quickly became evident.  In no time, first in Beijing and then throughout 
China, the Red Guards destroyed and pillaged, everywhere demanding radical, revolutionary 
reforms.12  In the process, however, the CYL was marginalized and quickly eliminated, and 
would in fact not reemerge for more than a decade, in 1978,13 and even since then, Beijing’s 
ideological control of Chinese youth has generally been relatively low.  In large part, this has 
been a result of capitalist and foreign influence, which has slowly corroded the state’s former 
ideological predominance.  Among other factors, the Special Economic Zones, the great 
many foreigners in China, and “the pervasive presence of Chinese from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan” on the Chinese mainland have exposed Chinese young people to voices well outside 
the purview of the Communist Party.14  To be sure, this does not mean that the state has 
given up on ideological power; as Gold notes, for example, in response to the events of 
                                                            
11 Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade: a History of the Cultural Revolution, trans. and ed. D.W.Y. Kwok 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 57-60.  
12 See especially, in general, ibid., 67-90. 
13 Thomas B. Gold, “Youth and the State,” Special Issue, The China Quarterly, no. 127 (September 1991): 605, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/654678; see also Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 127. 
14 As Gold put it in 1991, 
The Special Economic Zones such as Shenzhen occupied an extreme position, but foreign experts at 
schools and institutes in all major cities, resident foreign businessmen and technicians in enterprises, 
tourists traipsing throughout the country, foreign popular culture broadcast, published and performed 
live, and the excellent chance to study abroad all exerted powerful attraction to youths.  In particular 
the pervasive presence of Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan dramatically proved that Chinese 
people, given a conducive system, were fully capable of modernizing their economy, social system and 
culture.  Unrealistic as it may be, impressionable youths hold up these Chinese societies as well as the 
United States as standards by which to compare their own lives.  This increases the sense of relative 
deprivation.  It has also bred a strong sense of disliking everything Chinese as well as an inferiority 
complex, two serious problems which the CYL tries to combat, although with little more than 
cheerleading platitudes. 
Gold, “Youth and the State,” 609. 
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1989, the state decided to accelerate its ideological efforts vis-à-vis young people.15  
Nonetheless, clearly China’s relationship with its young people since the Cultural Revolution 
has contrasted sharply with that of the Soviet Union.  Ultimately, the CYL is analogous to 
the Komsomol only prior to the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.  It is therefore the 
period between 1949 and 1966 on which we will focus.            
II. Legitimating the Communist State      
 
     Indeed, 1966, the first year of the CR in China and the year in which the Red Guards 
made their debut, Leonid Brezhnev had this to say to the Komsomol Congress: 
The farther the great days of October recede into the past and the greater the 
number of youths and girls entering the Communist ranks who have not experienced 
severe trials in life, the more responsible become the tasks of ideological upbringing.  
We should give every young person an understanding of the general aims of our 
revolution, help him to find his concrete place in the revolutionary remaking of the 
world.  This cannot be done in full measure without training youth in the glorious 
traditions of the older generations.16 
 
Far from worried about youth pseudo-vigilantism, Brezhnev concerned himself that day, and 
his young audience, with the Revolution of 1917, the central founding myth of the Soviet 
Union and the most formative element of its cultural-ideological goals.   
     As Brezhnev suggested, maintaining the Revolution required the energies of young 
people. This was entirely in keeping with Soviet rhetorical tradition.  “The Revolution 
consumed its children as well as its makers,” wrote one scholar after the Second World War.  
“Like most revolutionary movements which attempt a sharp break with the past, the 
Communist leadership has placed its primary reliance on youth to generate the momentum 
                                                            
15 Ibid., 611. 
16 Quoted in Jeffrey W. Hahn, “The Komsomol Kollektiv as an Agency of Political Socialization,” Youth and 
Society 1, no. 2: 220, http://pao.chadwyck.com/PDF/1330357553100.pdf.    
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of innovation.”17  This should remind us of the Fascists, whose power was similarly 
considered contingent upon the support of the young.  In addition, alongside the 
Revolution, which had empowered the Communists in Russia and beyond, Marxism-
Leninism was held up of necessity as the civic religion of the Soviet Union and of 
Communist states elsewhere.  Thus the Komsomol always claimed to fight under the banner 
of the Revolution of 1917 in particular and the international socialist revolution in general.  
Sometimes the fight was quite literal, as during the Civil War,18 but other times less so; and 
although there were often tangible enemies against whom Komsomol members were told to 
struggle, other times the enemy was far less tangible and its connection to Communism was 
far vaguer. 
     There was nothing ambiguous, for example, about the Komsomol’s fight against religion.  
Religious beliefs, and certainly religious institutions, were problematic for the Soviet Union 
both because the state was atheistic and because, more basically, religion is necessarily a 
major contestant for ideological power.  As we have seen, this was a problem for the 
Fascists, too, not least for Mussolini, whose ideological dominance rested in large part on his 
capacity to stem the influence of the Vatican.  In the Soviet case, it is telling that one major 
reason that the Komsomol consistently had a harder time winning the hearts and minds of 
young people in rural areas (as opposed to their urban brethren) is that religious devotion 
tended to be relatively higher in the rural areas.19  Still, the Komsomol took seriously its 
opposition to religion from the start.  As Peter Gooderham points out in his study of 
                                                            
17 Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 19. 
18 During the Civil War between the Reds and the Whites, Komsomol members “were rushed to the front in 
successive mobilizations where they functioned as agitators, commissars, and shock troops, to provide 
leadership and inspiration for less dependable conscripts.” Ibid., 21. 
19 See ibid., 36. 
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youngsters in Leningrad in the early 1920s, still during Lenin’s reign, “Red christenings” and 
“Komsomol weddings” emerged as state alternatives to traditional religious rituals, along 
with special Komsomol versions of Christmas and Easter.20  Certainly, such extreme 
manifestations of state atheism were neither embraced nor practiced by every young Soviet,21 
but it is revealing nevertheless that the state pursued them at all.   
     But if the fight against religion is exemplary of the Soviet state’s efforts to counteract its 
competitors, it had, on the positive side, its own ideology to promote at the same time.  The 
ideological instruction of the Young Pioneers as well as the older members of the 
Komsomol tended to be straightforward.  Pioneers listened to stories about Lenin and Stalin 
as little boys, for example, while their Komsomol elders learned about Lenin and Stalin as 
revolutionaries.22  As always, legitimating the Revolution of 1917 in particular and 
Communist teachings in general was the chief objective.  Similarly, in early Communist 
China, while the Pioneers had many duties, “[t]he essential purpose” of everything they did 
“was the inculcation of Communist principles and organizational techniques.”  As one 
historian explains, “the Pioneers, under the leadership of the League, and both under the 
leadership of the Party, harnessed the energies and aspirations of youth to the needs of the 
apparatus, and did their best to ensure that young people would always be Chairman Mao’s 
‘good children.’”23   
     In the Soviet and Chinese cases alike, mass publications were crucial instruments in the 
                                                            
20 Peter Gooderham, “The Komsomol and Worker Youth: The Inculcation of ‘Communist Values’ in 
Leningrad during NEP,” Soviet Studies 34, no. 4 (Oct. 1982): 509, http://www.jstor.org/stable/151905; see also 
Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 29.  
21 See, e.g., Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 266-267 and 325. 
22 Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 29. 
23 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 126. 
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state’s efforts to propagate its ideological goals.  In early Communist China, the “systematic 
aim” of the CYL’s journal, Chung-kuo ch’ing-nien, “was the education of the younger 
generation in Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao-Tse-tung.”  As one historian notes, 
“It was also a convenient channel for conveying the League’s instructions and policies to 
branches throughout the country.”24  Likewise, in the USSR, the Komsomol’s contributions 
to Soviet publishing were substantial almost from the get-go, and it aimed, as a matter of 
course, not only to disseminate its own message(s), but also, and no less importantly, to 
silence alternative voices.  Thus, in the early 1920s, just as it was establishing a “publishing 
house” for itself (Molodaya gvardiya, or the Young Guard), the Komsomol was also “calling 
for the establishment of censorship over all published material aimed at youth.”  Not only 
did the Komsomol have its own narrative to promote, it had to promote the only narrative.  
The Leningrad Komsomol started producing its newspaper, Smena, on a daily basis in 
October 1924, and Komsomol’skaya prvada, “the central Komsomol newspaper” appeared 
shortly thereafter.25  The Komsomol also published books—and lots of them;26 as early as 
1927, the Young Guard “had established a monopoly of youth literature in the Russian 
language, and in terms of size it came second only to Gosizdat RSFSR.”27         
     In the USSR, then, every Komsomol member was obligated not only “to study Marxism-
Leninism”— surely a significant chore in and of itself—but also, as Merle Fainsod points 
out, to devote himself entirely to a sweeping ideological agenda.  This agenda demanded of 
each Komsomol member “constant efforts” to improve his knowledge of the Party 
program, and, moreover, that he espouse it to non-members.  Members were to be human 
                                                            
24 Ibid., 121. 
25 Gooderham, “The Komsomol and Worker Youth,” 511. 
26 Ibid., 511-512. 
27 Ibid., 521. 
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shields against attacks on socialism and to hone their “cultural, scientific and technical 
knowledge.”  They were to be ready at all times to protect, maybe with their lives, the 
“Socialist Fatherland,” and to be bulwarks against a host of antisocial behaviors, including 
“drunkenness, hooliganism, the remains of backward religious prejudices, and uncomradely 
attitudes toward women.”  The work of a Komsomol member, it seemed, was never done.28  
In China, members’ responsibilities, at least prior to 1966, were similar.29    
     Finally, it must be noted that nationalism, though supposedly antithetical to Marxist-
Leninist thought, has often come to the fore in Communist AYG.  In the Soviet case, World 
War II played a major role in the emergence of a Soviet nationalism entirely distinct from the 
teachings of Marx and Lenin.  “Hatred of the Nazis unleashed a genuine upsurge of feeling, 
which the Party leadership was shrewd enough both to stimulate and exploit.  Communist 
slogans were muted,” one historian tells us, “and the wellsprings of national sentiment were 
tapped to the full.”  Naturally, the Komsomol was not left out of the loop:  the 
organization’s membership restrictions were eased for military men and women, who, as the 
fighting waged, “responded primarily to patriotic appeals.”30  After the war, the Moscow-
published Young Communists in the USSR noted that the Komsomol’s “most important task” 
                                                            
28 As Fainsod notes puts it, each Komsomol member was expected to make 
constant efforts to raise his political literacy, to explain the political line of the Party to the broad 
masses of youth, to fulfill the decisions of the Party and the Komsomol organizations, to participate 
actively in the political life of the country, to provide an example of socialist attitudes toward work 
and study, to protect socialist property, to struggle decisively against all breaches of socialist legality 
and order, to demonstrate political vigilance by guarding war and state secrets, to master the cultural, 
scientific and technical knowledge which will enable him to perfect his qualifications, to study military 
affairs, to be always ready to give all his strength and if necessary his life for the defense of his 
Socialist Fatherland, to seek to stamp out drunkenness, hooliganism, the remains of backward 
religious prejudices, and uncomradely attitudes toward women, to participate actively in the work of 
his Komsomol organization, to attend all meetings, and to fulfill all decisions swiftly and accurately. 
Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 29-30.  
29 See, e.g., Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 119. 
30 Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 26.  Indeed, in the Komsomol in particular and in the leadership of the Soviet 
Union generally, veterans (frontoviki) dominated after the Second World War. See especially Fürst, Stalin’s Last 
Generation, 58-59 and 271. 
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consisted in “maintain[ing] in all the youth Soviet patriotism, Soviet national pride, the 
aspiration to make our Socialist state ever stronger.”31  These were hardly sentiments Marx 
or his closest followers could have supported.  Meanwhile, in the Chinese case, one study 
shows that even young Red Guards who became disillusioned by Communism and by the 
state itself nevertheless “retained a sense of obligation to serve the nation and of 
patriotism.”32  And in China today, conventional Communist themes like “class struggle” are 
being deemphasized in school books, whilst as nationalist themes, meant “to foster love of 
the motherland,” are being showcased.33 
     In the next section, we will encounter young Pavlik Morozov, whose story, as we will see, 
became in the Stalin era a fixture of Soviet propaganda.  Pavlik was quickly transformed into 
a martyr by Soviet officialdom, largely in order to advance a wedge between parents and 
their children.  Another martyr, however, this time from Maoist China, belongs in the 
present section.  Lei Feng died in 1962 when he was 22-years-old, only to be heralded in 
short order as “industrious, generous and irresistibly impish, China’s most endearing soldier, 
the sort of fellow who would darn his comrades’ socks and skip a meal so others might eat.”  
Mao tried to use Lei Feng’s celebrated story to stir among Chinese youngsters feelings of 
“self-sacrifice and patriotism,” as a recent report in The New York Times recalls.  What is 
                                                            
31 Quoted in Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 34. See also, in general, where Fürst notes that the Second World 
War gave the USSR “a second lifeline.  It provided the Soviet Union with a second founding myth, a shared 
memory of commonly overcome danger and a renewed guard against enemies from within and without,” as 
well as  
a new set of heroes—heroes who were contemporary, close to the people, and utterly irresistible in 
virtue of their self-sacrifice in defence [sic] of the socialist motherland.  They rebuilt the link between 
regime and people by demonstrating that ordinary people were united with authority in fighting for 
the same values at the same time.  Unlike the distant images of Lenin, Stalin, and the Soviet political 
and cultural elite, the war hero came in all shapes and sizes. 
Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 137. 
32 Gold, “Youth and the State,” 603. 
33 Stanley Rosen, “Contemporary Chinese Youth and the State,” The Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 2 (May 
2009): 367, doi: 10.1017/S0021911809000631.   
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particularly noteworthy is that Lei Feng, despite his enduring heroic status among officials, in 
fact seems to awaken in many ordinary Chinese opposition, rather than support, for their 
government.  This may be but one small indication of a larger problem for officials in 
Beijing.34 
III. All in the Family:  Children, Parents, Gender and Sex 
 
     Volumes have been written on relationships of all sorts in the Soviet Union, including 
relationships between parents and their children and between women and men.  No attempt 
even to synopsize this literature is made here.  Instead, the following few words are intended 
only to introduce the reader to the complex nexus that connected the Soviet individual to 
her family and to her fellow citizen. 
A. Families, Parents, and Children      
     As we have seen at some length, among the various extra-state institutions that 
authoritarian states attempt to influence, the family may be the toughest nut to crack.35  In 
general, however, the Komsomol demonstrated a great propensity to insert itself into 
families, and especially (as we should now expect) between parents and their children.  It is 
revealing that, in addition to the religion factor noted above, one of the greatest obstacles to 
the Komsomol’s penetration of the rural Soviet Union was the salience of family ties there.36  
At the same time, noted Fainsod in 1951,  
the relative weakness of the Communist apparatus in the villages contributes to the 
strength of family influences.  As the youth are drained away from the villages for 
                                                            
34 Andrew Jacobs, “Chinese Heroism Effort is Met With Cynicism,” The New York Times, March 5, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/asia/lei-feng-day-draws-chinese-cynicism.html. 
35 Thus, for example, the early Komsomol in Leningrad “was…prepared to sanction those young people who 
were forced by their parents to attend religious ceremonies leaving home and becoming independent,” only to 
back down quickly for fear of “underming[ing] the importance of family life for working class youth.”  
Gooderham, “The Komsomol and Worker Youth,” 509. 
36 Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 36; see also 21. Emphasis added. See also Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 44-45, 
99, 111, and 316. 
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military service or industrial work, they are, of course, removed from family 
pressures and are subjected to more intensive Communist indoctrination.  In the 
process, new converts are won for Komsomol and Party, but how genuinely and 
profoundly fundamental attitudes shift is by no means clear.37 
 
     For the Communist Party of China, religion and family were similarly impedimentary to 
state ideological power, and indeed the two may have been even more intimately connected 
in China than in the USSR.  As Thomas B. Gold notes, historically in China, the family has 
been “not only the basic production, consumption, and socialization unit,” but “also [is] 
invested with quasi-religious significance through the practice of ancestor worship.”  The 
individual in Chinese tradition achieves his individuality only by virtue of his family, whose 
power relative to the state is significant, and only in adulthood.38  What is more, historically, 
the Chinese state in large measure “reinforced the family system,” such that youngsters 
tended to be tied for good to the fate of their families.  But all of this had to change once the 
Revolution came.  After 1949, while the Communists “continued to rely on the family to 
perform key functions, particularly in the rural areas,” Beijing’s goals demanded that it 
circumscribe the family’s traditional hegemony and clamp down tightly on the individual.  
“Much of the family’s power shifted to the Party, and the newly-‘liberated’ individual’s 
sphere of autonomy was kept from expanding.”39   
                                                            
37 Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 36. 
38 As Gold writes, 
The Chinese family traditionally was not only the basic production, consumption and socialization 
unit, it was also invested with quasi-religious significance through the practice of ancestor worship.  
The family enjoyed a great deal of scope to manage its own affairs independently of the state.  Its 
members literally belonged to the family whose head determined their life course.  Males learned that 
their primary allegiance was to the family and its continuance, and that they had to submit 
unquestioningly to its authority.  The head assigned members to various roles to implement a family 
strategy to achieve wealth and status.  Chinese related to the outside world as members of a family, 
not as individuals.  The family was rigorously age and gender stratified.  In the Confucian view, one 
did not establish oneself until the age of 30. 
Gold, “Youth and the State,” 597. 
39 Ibid., 598. Emphasis mine. 
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     Certainly for the governors of the Soviet Union, undercutting the traditional influence of 
the family by pushing parents and children apart consistently constituted a priority.  And 
while there were instances in which such a separation was affected without the aid of the 
Soviet AYG,40 often authoritarian youth groups were clearly intended to drive a wedge 
between children and their roditelii. There were instances, for example, of children betraying 
their parents to the authorities, as in Nazi Germany.  True, only in the most extreme 
situations did sons actually rat out their parents for being insufficiently devoted to, e.g., 
collectivization and the new kolkhozi life, but this did occur, and often such betrayal was 
linked to participation in AYG and earned kids AYG rewards.41   
     By far the most important act of betrayal by a Soviet son was that of Pavlik Morozov, a 
fifteen-year-old living in the rural Siberian village of Gerasimovka.  According to legend, 
little Pavlik, a member of the Pioneers, was savagely murdered by his own family after he 
had ratted out his “kulak” father, Trofim Morozov.  Thus Pavlik was a martyr in official 
eyes, a great hero because he had put the interest of the state before even that of his own 
father.  In truth, contrary to the propaganda, Pavlik was not a Pioneer at all and his father 
                                                            
40 Neither the Komsomol alone, nor any other single institution, can be blamed, for example, for the various 
features of early Soviet life which ripped children from their mothers and fathers.  The collectivization of the 
peasant economy under Stalin, for instance, “divided families, setting sons against their fathers, over whether to 
embrace the Soviet way of life.” Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Picador, 
2007), 128. 
41 As Figes writes, 
How many sons actually denounced their own fathers is hard to say.  There were certainly a few, if 
not quite as many as one might believe from the Soviet press….  The press reported that a Pioneer 
called Sorokin had caught his father stealing kolkhoz grain and had him arrested by the police; that a 
schoolboy called Seryozha Fadeyev had told his headmaster where his father had concealed a store of 
potatoes; and that a thirteen-year-old boy called Pronia Kolibin had denounced his own mother for 
stealing grain from kolkhoz fields (he was rewarded with a trip to Artek, the famous Pioneer holiday 
camp in the Crimea, while his mother was sent to a labor camp). 
Ibid., 128-129. 
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had fought for the Red Army.42  Less important than the sordid details of Pavlik’s story, 
however, is the degree to which it was embraced by Soviet officialdom.  Pavlik Morozov, 
supposedly a model Pioneer, quickly became a staple of Soviet propaganda, especially 
propaganda intended for young people.  As Orlando Figes explains, 
The cult was everywhere.  Stories, films, poems, plays, biographies and songs all 
portrayed Pavlik as a perfect Pioneer, a loyal vigilante of the Party in the home.  His 
selfless courage…was promoted as an example for all Soviet schoolchildren.  The cult 
had a huge impact on the moral norms and sensibilities of a whole generation of 
children, who learned from Pavlik that loyalty to the state was a higher virtue than family 
love and other personal ties.  Through the cult the idea was sown in millions of minds 
that snitching on one’s friends and relatives was not shameful but public-spirited.  It was 
indeed expected of the Soviet citizen.43 
 
Thus, with almost unthinkable hubris—and largely by way of its authoritarian youth 
groups—the Soviet state instructed its children to serve the Kremlin before their own 
parents.  Meanwhile, mothers and fathers, as in Nazi Germany, were to be on the lookout; 
any criticism or questioning of official orthodoxy could spell their doom, potentially at the 
hands of their own kids. 
B. Gender and Relationships 
     With some notable exceptions, Communism in practice tends to treat gender and sex 
much as Fascism does.  The most important distinction is related to gender equality.  
Whereas the Fascists, as we have seen, seemed little interested in progressing toward parity 
between men and women, the Communists took gender equality seriously and have 
historically sought to institutionalize it.  Often this institutionalization affects, or affected by, 
                                                            
42 Still, it may be true that Pavlik denounced his father for aiding kulaks.  Apparently, as one historian explains, 
Pavlik was “active in agitation work, which brought him close to the police.”  Pavlik first denounced his father, 
who was later executed, and then commenced his own small-scale reign of terror on the village, reporting 
anybody “who concealed grain or spoke out against the kolkhoz.”  Pavlik and his accomplice, his nine-year-old 
brother Fyodor, were killed in short order, although not likely by their own family.  The quotations appear in 
ibid., 123 and 124; for Figes’ summary of the story, see ibid., 122-124. 
43 Ibid., 125. 
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AYG.  In the Soviet case, the creation of the Pioneers in 1922, for example, for which little 
boys and little girls alike were eligible, was considered exemplary of the USSR’s successful 
establishment of gender equality.44  But the road to gender equality in the Soviet Union was 
not always sunshine and song, as the history of the Komsomol, especially in its early years, 
indicates.   
     As Ann Livschiz notes, while the 1920s in Russia had been “associated with sexual 
freedom and experimentation, as well as a relatively open discussion of sexuality and 
relations between men and women,” things changed in the 1930s.  Primarily in response to 
widespread anxiety about the sexual behavior of young Soviet subjects, this new era would 
witness “an escape into Puritanism,” with different results for girls and boys.45  What is 
more, this new conservatism persisted well after the Second World War, such that sex was 
often publicly discussed only “via its most negative consequences:  extra-marital affairs, 
teenage pregnancies, widespread venereal disease, and illegal abortions.”46  At any rate, in 
general, the state endeavored to change significantly the ways that ordinary people viewed 
gender and sex, and naturally the Komsomol was expected to play a major role in helping 
the state realize its new goals.47   
     For example, in a remarkable show of state authority, in the post-Stalin USSR, 
“Komsomol patrols” reportedly “broke up couples in amorous embraces on fields, chastised 
youngsters kissing in the street, and strictly observed the decency of movements on the 
                                                            
44 Ann Livschiz, “Battling ‘Unhealthy Relations’:  Soviet Youth Sexuality as a Political Problem,” Journal of 
Historical Sociology 21, no. 4 (December 2008): 397, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.2008.00343.x.  
45 Ibid., 399 and 402, respectively. 
46 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 285. 
47 See, e.g., ibid., 261-262, 266, 268, and 280-283.  
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dance floor.”48  At the risk of belaboring the obvious:  kissing has nothing (or so it would 
seem) to do with Marxism-Leninism.  But the cultural conservatism of the Soviet state 
demanded that romance and sex be, if not vilified, certainly viewed with suspicion.  Even 
friendship was sometimes worrisome given its purported potential to engender solidarities 
outside the purview of the state.  For instance, after World War II, a group of young people 
in Moscow calling itself Close Friendship aroused Komsomol antennae, and in short order 
its members were barred from joining the VLKSM and attending university.  What is 
interesting is that, over time, and not least in the era of destalinizatsiia, such informal groups 
came to be permitted by the state in what amounted to a surprising (but perhaps necessary) 
concession.  As Juliane Fürst notes, 
Close Friendship was a herald of things to come.  So-called kompanii, groups of 
friends, who assembled in private spaces in order to drink, dance, and exchange 
literature, political opinions, art, and any other cultural artifact, became a fixture on 
the youth scene in the Khrushchev years, when a more liberal climate allowed them 
to flourish in the semi-open.  Friendship became not only a stubborn defence [sic] 
mechanism for a private sphere, increasingly it pushed into the public realm, claiming 
functions hitherto reserved for the organs of the state. 
The radicalism of these kompanii is thus hard to overstate.  As Fürst points out, seen in this 
light, “Friendship was thus not only a potential competitor to Komsomol comradeship, but 
both encouraged the collective breaking of norms and constituted a private challenge to the 
system’s monopoly on the public sphere.”49 
IV. Building the Next Nomenklatura 
 
          Like authoritarian youth groups generally, the Komsomol was clearly meant to 
facilitate the matriculation of the (apparently) best and the brightest into the annals of the 
state machinery.  It is worth remembering that throughout the Soviet Union’s vast territory 
                                                            
48 Ibid., 266. 
49 Ibid., 259. 
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and for a variety of purposes, the creation of cultural-political elites was a project almost 
from the get-go.  In Central Asia, for example, which the Russians clearly viewed as the most 
culturally-backward part of the Soviet Union, “Korenizatsiia” was the project of inventing a 
local Soviet elite, attaching indigenes to the larger USSR, and thereby providing those local 
elites with “roots” (koreni) by which they would be tied to the central state.  Ultimately, 
Korenizatsiia required enormous efforts and produced only modest results.  But young 
people, in Russia and beyond, naturally presented an even greater, and ultimately a far more 
important, challenge.  From youngsters, of necessity, the next Soviet generation would be 
drawn, and that meant that the next generation of apparatchiki would also come from among 
the youth.  Writing in 1951, Julius Gould clearly recognized the elite-formation function of 
the Komsomol and, moreover, correctly linked it to Stalin’s Purges in the 1920s and 1930s.  
As he put it, the Komsomol’s 
significance was recognized as the reserve from which would be selected the future 
leaders of the Bolshevik Party and the expert functionaries of the one-party State.  In 
the “purge-years”…it was shorn of many of its leaders…the rank and file were 
likewise thinned by denunciations leading to mass-expulsions.  Soviet Youth was 
given in its own flesh a demonstration that the “purge” was an institutional and not an 
accidental feature of life in the one-party State.50 
 
     This paper is of course focused primarily on the ambitions and interests of states, but it is 
valuable here, if only briefly, to note the dissonance between the aspirations of the state, on 
the hand, and the aspirations of parents and children, on the other, with regard to the elite-
formation function of AYG.  While states try to use their authoritarian youth groups to find 
their most loyal supporters, many youngsters, along with many parents, are motivated to join 
AYG less by ideological sentiments than by pragmatic, and especially careerist, goals.  We 
                                                            
50 Gould, “The Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend,” 306. Emphasis in original. 
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will see in the next chapter that, in today’s Russia, Nashi affords major benefits to its 
members, among them valuable educational and internship opportunities.  Likewise, in the 
Soviet Union, careerist ambitions drove many a young Soviet to join the Komsomol.  
Beyond the organization’s true believers, on whose steely devotion to officialdom the state 
relied in its efforts to build up the Party and the secret police, many more members simply, 
and understandably, wanted good jobs.51  In China, certainly some would-be members of the 
post-CR iteration of the CYL have been motivated by similar ambitions.52                
     Meanwhile, from the perspective of the state, two opposing ambitions have historically 
given way to what may at times seem like inconsistent policies.  To the extent that 
Communist states seek young people to carry on the socialist revolution, governors look in 
earnest for those worthy of the task.  Thus, in early Communist China, for example, “Party-
led organizations in schools, worksites, recreational associations and neighbourhoods [sic] 
were charged with inculcating the official values in youths and closely monitoring their 
behaviour [sic] and thoughts, testing their suitability as revolutionary successors.”53  Yet, 
while in may seek the best and the brightest “revolutionary successors,” on the one hand, the 
state also seeks, on the other, to influence as many young people as possible.   
     In general terms, the tension is between quality and quantity.  The Hitler Jugend, of 
course, never faced this tension because, as we have seen, membership in the HJ became 
mandatory for all young Germans just before the war began (and by 1942 was enforceable 
by Himmler).  But the Communist cases are clearly different.  Well into the 1930s, the 
                                                            
51 Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 38 and 39. 
52 Gold, “Youth and the State,” 607. 
53 Ibid., 599. The same was true in the Soviet case.  As Fainsod explains, “The Komsomol is the reservoir from 
which Party members will be recruited; and in the eyes of the Party leadership at least, this is the period of 
tutelage when qualifications can be sifted and political ardor tested.” Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 29. 
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VLKSM in the Soviet Union was “regarded as a relatively exclusive class organization with 
membership primarily recruited from proletarian elements in the cities and the poorer 
peasantry in the villages.”  Only in 1936 were the rules changed so that membership would 
thereafter be granted simply to those who supported the regime, regardless of their class 
status.  We will see below that the Chinese took the same step in the middle-1960s.  
Suddenly, as Victor C. Funnell writes, “[e]ven youths from landlord, rich peasant and 
capitalist backgrounds were eligible to join.”54 
     Why did the Komsomol change its policy in 1936, opting, as it were, for quantity over 
quality?  In short, as this paper’s central argument would anticipate, the Komsomol 
expanded in order to improve its capacity to advance Soviet ideology.  As Fainsod argues, 
whereas the Komsomol had focused mainly on the economic sphere upon the 
commencement of the Five Year Plan,55 by 1936 its “main task” became “Communist 
indoctrination of youth.”  Fainsod explains, 
The Komsomols were not to participate in economic questions as actively as they 
had done before; their major attention was to be turned to the educational task.  
Programs were also to be developed to appeal more widely to youth.  The 
Komsomol leadership was called upon to emphasize “cultural” as well as political 
work, to organize athletic competitions, ski excursions, musicales, dramatics, dances, 
and evening literary discussions in order to minister to the many-sided interests of 
youth and to attract its support. Under the impetus of these measures, membership 
grew sharply. By October, 1939, it had climbed to 9,000,000.56 
      
     Remarkably, the Chinese made a similar move in 1955, when “it was decided to expand 
the membership, particularly in rural areas.”  Maybe even more than their Soviet 
                                                            
54 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 117; see also 129. 
55 “With the initiation of the Five Year Plan, the whole weight of Komsomol activity had been turned in the 
direction of emergency economic activity—the construction of new industrial plants, the organization of 
Kolkhozes, and the whipping up of enthusiasm for the manifold enterprises embraced in the Plan.” Fainsod, 
“The Komsomols,” 24. 
56 Ibid., 25. 
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counterparts, the Chinese leadership was essentially seeking to find and institutionalize a 
functional equilibrium between quality and quantity.  As Funnell noted in 1970, by the 
middle-1950s, the CCP had come to see “that too much stress on the League’s elitist 
character tended to make it a ‘second Party,’ while concentration on mass youth work alone, 
without an advanced nucleus of leadership such as the League, led to loose and ineffective 
control over the movement.”57  In the middle-1960s, once again, the leadership put major 
emphasis on increasing membership, again with particular focus on gaining rural recruits.58  
By this point, becoming a member of the CYL seemed to some far too easy.59        
     In the Soviet case, one noteworthy effect of this turn toward quantity (as opposed to 
quality) was that Komsomol elites were constantly looking for ways both to bring members 
to their ranks and to maintain the support of those who had already joined.  Because young 
Soviets were not required to join the organization, the Komsomol had to woo them (and, at 
the same time, keep current Komsomol members from quitting).  This meant that the 
Komsomol had to be at least moderately responsive to the desires and interests of its 
constituents.  In this way, as a sort of vaguely representative body for young Soviets, the 
                                                            
57 Funnell, “The Chinese Communist Youth Movement,” 114-115.  
58 Ibid., 116. 
59 As Funnell writes, 
Mass recruitment…may have altered the character of the League to something less than “an 
organization of advanced youth.”  Even youths from landlord, rich peasant and capitalist backgrounds 
were eligible to join.  The recruitment plans handed down to League branches may, therefore, have 
caused them some embarrassment.  Some complained that there were insufficient youths in their 
locality holding the requisite qualifications.  The official answer of the League was not that there were 
too few eligible youths but that the qualifications demanded were too high.  The League mirrored the 
Party in every respect.  In recruitment policy it, too, could lower the political and other requirements 
where necessary, in the interests of expansion, or where class back-ground seemed to offer an 
alternative guarantee of political reliability. 
Ibid., 117. 
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Komsomol took on a certain corporatist hue, especially once destalinizatsiia set in under 
Khrushchev and the participatory features of the Komsomol were emphasized.60   
V. Conclusions 
     One scholar, Neil Robinson, goes so far as to argue that the Soviets’ ultimate incapacity 
to maintain ideological predominance spelled the USSR’s demise:  once the state’s 
stranglehold on ideological power ceased in the Gorbachev era, the regime was sent into a 
(predictable) tailspin.61  Does Communist China—which, as of this writing, has endured 
nearly as long as the Soviet Union did—avoid a similar fate by its governors’ reluctant 
acceptance of limited ideological freedom, not least for its youth?  Certainly Beijing’s 
ideological power vis-à-vis Chinese youngsters pales in comparison to the ideological power 
for which Moscow once hungered vis-à-vis its own youth population, but this might be 
precisely in the state’s interest.  Just as China’s erstwhile socialism has largely eroded in the 
face of economic necessity, so has the state gradually conceded ideological power.  As Gold 
wrote in 1991, even some measure of extra-state associational life for youth has developed—
that is, has been permitted to develop—in Communist China.62  If Robinson’s theory of the 
                                                            
60 For short descriptions of the putatively participatory elements of the Komsomol at the level of the kollektiv 
and the various benefits of membership, see especially Hahn, “The Komsomol Kollektiv,” 230-233; see also 
where Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod allude to this pseudo-corporatist feature: 
On the one hand, the organization surely was established to help promote party values among the 
younger generation and to mobilize the energies of youth into activities that further party goals….  
On the other hand, in trying to achieve these goals, Komsomol officials inevitably find that the 
acceptance of regime values by young people and their willingness to participate in socially useful 
activities depends not only on propaganda activities but also on concrete conditions and policies 
which are specifically relevant to their lives.  As a consequence, Komsomol officials cannot inculcate a 
Marxist-Leninist world view unless they attempt to represent youth interests in the policy process at 
least to some extent. 
Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1979), 404. 
61 Neil Robinson, Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System:  A Critical History of Soviet Ideological Discourse 
(Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1995), especially 29 and 193.   
62 Gold, “Youth and the State,” 611. 
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Soviet collapse is right, then presumably these steps have been the right ones.  In the next 
chapter, in which we turn to the present-day Russian Federation, we will ask to what extent 
V.V. Putin’s youth organization, Nashi, has mimicked the Komsomol—and to what extent it 
has avoided the Komsomol’s mistakes.  
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Chapter IV:  Nashi in Putin’s Russia1  
“We don’t want a revolution here.  We want to make the country stronger.” 
—Kcenia, Moscow teenager and Nashi member, in 20052 
 
I. Introduction:  Putin Moves Forward—and Looks Back 
 
      The fall of the Soviet Union brought nearly eighty years of dogged authoritarianism to an 
end and gave way to Russia’s brief encounter with democracy.  But if, under the dissident-
cum-president Boris Yel’tsin, the Russian state was for the first time exposed to democracy, it 
was also exposed to great instability and faced, in quite short order, a significant reduction of 
its power.  This, to be sure, was out of step with the historical norm in Russia, where “power 
tends to be concentrated at the very top of the state hierarchy and personalized in a chief 
executive.”3  It was perhaps little surprise, then, that restoring the power of the central state 
became the chief objective of Yel’tsin’s enormously capable successor, V.V. Putin.  In 
particular, Putin would be tasked with (re)consolidating political power which had been 
largely dispersed among regional actors during the Yel’tsin years.  His grasp on power 
routinely insecure, Yel’tsin’s ascendance in the 1990s had largely depended on his willingness 
to trade the authority of the central state to “regional governors”—who, in turn, wasted no 
time putting it to use.4  It would fall to Putin, then, to stop the bleeding.  Only under Putin 
                                                            
1 This chapter is based heavily on a term paper I wrote for a graduate seminar (PO80901) at Boston College 
with Professor Easter in Fall 2010. 
2 Quoted in Julian Evans, “How Putin Youth is Indoctrinated to Foil Revolution,” The Times (London), July 18, 
2005, 28. I accessed this newspaper article, and all other newspaper and magazine articles cited here unless 
otherwise noted, in the LexisNexis database, accessed via Boston College.  I have also capitalized titles of 
articles where appropriate in the interest of uniformity.      
3 Gerald M. Easter, “The Russian State in the Time of Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 24, no. 3 (2008): 200, doi: 
10.2747/1060-586X.24.3.199.   
4 With remarkable speed, as Easter explains, “regional governors effectively became autonomous political 
actors, elected from below instead of appointed from above.” The suddenly-empowered regional governors 
then found themselves well-positioned to demand yet more power, necessarily threatening the central state. 
“Yel’tsin’s strategy to hold it all together through ad hoc negotiations produced an uneven and contradictory 
federal structure.” Ibid.  
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would the hyper-regionalism of the transitional 1990s be replaced by the hyper-centralized 
state of Russian tradition. 
     Part and parcel of Putin’s nationalization efforts was his government’s creation of 
authoritarian youth groups.5  The most important, Nashi (“Ours”), is the subject of this 
chapter.  The group, which emerged in 2005, succeeded another Russian AYG called 
Walking Together.6  In the summer of 2008, Nashi boasted well over 100,000 members 
between the ages of 17 and 25 years.7  As we will see, Nashi members are not 
revolutionaries, but counterrevolutionaries, and they serve not “the proletariat,” “socialism,” 
or “the Party,” but the state, and especially Putin himself.  In the following pages, we will 
look first at Nashi’s origins, and then, as in previous chapters, turn to each of its major 
ideological goals.  We will see that, like AYG across time and space, Nashi aims to legitimate 
the nation-state and to demonstrate at the same time the homogeneity of the Russian nation; 
to promote a certain set of moral standards and, most of all, to promote specific norms 
related to gender and/or sex; and to affect the formation of a new nomenklatura whose 
members will support the state and its aims.  In addition, we will see in the following pages 
that the creators of Nashi seem clearly to have based Nashi in very large part on the most 
important of the Soviet-era authoritarian youth groups, the Komsomol.  Indeed, the 
                                                            
5 Nashi, which we examine here, was said to be one of many “political tools” dreamed up by Kremlin bigwig 
Vladislav Y. Surkov in support of Putin’s agenda.  According to one newspaper report, Surkov “created an 
array of political tools—the youth movement Nashi, the United Russia party and the overwhelming force of 
fully controlled television—that helped Vladimir V. Putin consolidate his authority during his first two 
presidential terms.” Ellen Barry, “Architect of Russia’s Centralized Political System under Putin Is Reassigned,” 
The New York Times, December 28, 2011 (Late Edition—Final), 4. 
6 See, e.g., Adrian Blomfield, “Party Girl Pawns Her Own Diamonds to Take on Putin at Politics,” The Daily 
Telegraph (London), June 1, 2006, 17. 
7 Luke Harding, “G2: Welcome to Putin’s Summer Camp…: Nashi, the Kremlin’s Youth Organisation [sic], 
Holds a Lakeside Get-Together Each Year for Its Followers. Its Official Mission is to Fight Fascism. So What 
Do Mass Weddings, Rabbit T-Shirts and the Benny Hill Theme Tune Have to Do With It All?” The Guardian 
(London), July 24, 2008 (Final Edition), 12.   
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question seems to be less whether the Komsomol has helped to inform Nashi, but rather to 
what extent it has provided Nashi a positive example and, on the other hand, to what extent 
it has demonstrated to Nashi’s planners what to avoid.        
II. The “Orange” Threat and the Origins of Nashi 
 
A. Revolution in the Neighborhood  
    The first and most immediate objective that Nashi was meant to address upon its 
founding in 2005 was counterrevolutionary in the most prosaic and literal sense.  The 
Kremlin feared the emergence of a Russian “color revolution” of the sort that had appeared 
in other post-Communist states—Serbia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine—and thus 
constructed an ostensible “youth movement” to guard against anti-regime upheaval.  
Particularly worrisome to Moscow was the so-called Orange Revolution in next-door 
Ukraine, where local activists had risen up en masse against presidential candidate and 
Kremlin-ally Viktor Yanukovych in favor of his Western-looking opponent, Viktor 
Yuschenko.  In preparation for the election, Putin had gone to Ukraine to offer his 
endorsement to Yanukovych, and Russia had even bankrolled Yanukovych’s campaign,8 but 
these steps had clearly been insufficient.  In what was manifestly a victory for Ukraine’s 
independence from Russia, Yuschenko won the election and was inaugurated shortly 
thereafter.  In short order, Nashi appeared.  The new authoritarian youth group was to serve 
as a bulwark against the great Orange threat, not unlike the way the Komsomol had served 
the Reds against the Whites a century before.9           
                                                            
8 Matthew Collin, The Time of the Rebels: Youth Resistance Movements and 21st Century Revolutions (London: Serpents 
Tail, 2007), 115. What is more, many of the young pro-Yuschenko activists had mobilized against Yanukovych 
because, at least in part, of Yanukovych’s cozy rapport with Russia! Collin, Time of the Rebels, 118-119. 
9 On the well-known origins of Nashi, see, e.g., Andrew Osborn, “Putin Sets Up Youth Group to Stop Orange 
Revolution’ [sic],” The Independent (London), March 1, 2005 (First Edition), 23; Peter Finn, “Another Russian 
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     It has been suggested that Putin was in fact little concerned about the potential for revolt 
in Russia, fearing instead decreased sway in his near-abroad.10  But the president’s actions as 
well as his words call into question the veracity of that claim.  If indeed Putin’s interest in the 
Orange Revolution was rooted in his regional power objectives, to what do we attribute 
Putin’s domestic response?  Why, in answer to the Orange Revolution, should Putin have 
instigated “classic Soviet measures” at home11 if his major concern was Russia’s regional 
power?  By late 2005, even the president himself had to admit that he was “afraid” of the 
events in Ukraine.  He feared, he said, “a banana republic where the one who shouts loudest 
is the one who wins.”12   
     In addition to the natural fear of internal opposition, two other, perhaps less obvious 
triggers of Putin’s Orange anxiety deserve to be noted.  First, Putin’s early stint in 
Communist Germany, where at the end of the Cold War he witnessed, with the rest of the 
world, the bottom-up destruction of the Communist state, clearly impacted his outlook in 
general,13 and may have been particularly salient in his mind as he watched the events in 
Ukraine unfold.  Second, at least in one sense, Putin came by his paranoia honestly; the fear 
of a “Fifth Column” such as he exhibited in this period has a long tradition in twentieth-
century Russian history, even pre-dating Stalin.  Well before the Purges of the prewar years, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Revolution?; Youth Movement Adopts Spirit of Uprisings Nearby,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2005 (Final 
Edition), A17.    
10 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March-April 
2006): 62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031911. 
11 As one scholar noted at the time, “Putin’s response to the Orange Revolution…was a return to classic Soviet 
measures—more repression but also more social care and state paternalism.” Ivan Krastev, “Democracy’s 
‘Doubles’” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 60, doi: 10.1353/jod.2006.0030.     
12 Quoted in Jonathan Steele, “Putin Still Bitter Over Orange Revolution,” The Guardian (London), September 
6, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/06/russia.jonathansteele. 
13 As Easter points out, “Putin witnessed the explosive results of mixing spontaneous social movement with 
tentative state coercion in East Germany in 1989.  It is not unreasonable to suppose that Putin’s German 
experience, in which a seemingly stable political regime hesitant to use force was suddenly toppled from below, 
might explain his heavy-handed reaction to opposition protests in Russia.” Easter, “The Russian State,” 205.   
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the Bol’sheviks’ fear of being undermined from within was intense, perhaps because of their 
own experience.  Some have argued that Lenin’s quick defeat of the tsar’ and the rapid 
seizure of power by the Bol’sheviks’ induced them to worry that a coup of similar swiftness 
would dethrone them.14  It would seem, then, that, at least in some narrow sense, when Putin 
feared the upheaval of his government, he followed in the footsteps of his (Communist) 
forefathers. 
B. Nashi Makes its Debut 
     Nashi’s architects as well as its members were similarly explicit about Nashi’s origins.  As 
early as March 2005, unnamed Nashi higher-ups asserted their opposition to “orange 
revolution,”15 and in April Nashi spokesman Ivan Mostovich explained that “everything that 
happened in Ukraine shook Russia.”16  Shortly thereafter, in July, Kremlin heavy-hitter and 
former Yanukovych adviser Gleb Pavlovksy prevailed upon an audience of three-thousand 
Nashi members, who had gathered at Lake Seliger as they would every year thereafter, “to 
defend” (in his words) “the constitutional order if and when the coup comes.”17  Any initial 
uncertainty as to Nashi’s primary objective would not last long.     
     Remarkably, even in April 2007, well after Yuschenko’s inauguration in Ukraine, 15,000 
Nashi members were loitering around Moscow, distributing 10,000 SIM cards and informing 
those who received them precisely how to use them.  As a report at the time explained, 
The cards allowed users to send text messages to the Kremlin—to be answered 
promptly by Nashi volunteers.  Recipients were also instructed to use the cards to 
report any signs of an incipient Orange revolution.  In that event, the cards would 
instantly relay text-message instructions on what to do and where to rally.  “We 
explained to Muscovites that we should all be prepared for the pro-Western 
                                                            
14 See, e.g., Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 262-264. 
15 Quoted in Osborn, “Putin Sets Up Youth Group,” 23.   
16 Quoted in Finn, “Another Russian Revolution?” A17.   
17 Quoted in Evans, “How Putin Youth is Indoctrinated,” 28. Emphasis added.   
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revolution, funded by America,” says Nashi activist Tatyana Matiash, 22.  “People 
must know what to do to save their motherland in case their radio and TV stop 
working.”18 
 
Similarly, in late 2007, Nashi members could again be seen in Moscow, this time with the 
local police, with whom the group had struck a friendship.  Hundreds of Nashi members 
were said to “have undergone training and donned red armbands as druzhniki, reviving a 
term from Soviet times to describe the volunteer corps.”  Moreover, Nashi insisted that 
there were many more of its members where those had come from:  the group claimed that 
thousands of its acolytes would be “patrolling” the capital “during the elections, with more 
in other cities,”19 an obvious warning to anyone contemplating anti-regime activity.  To the 
surprise of no one, right on cue, in late 2011, Nashi announced that thousands of its 
representatives would be in Moscow to keep an eye on the casting and counting of ballots.20     
III. Legitimating the post-Communist State 
 
     Nashi, then, at least in its initial iteration, was intended to serve the Russian government, 
and especially V.V. Putin himself, as a counterrevolutionary force.  But beyond preventing 
Orange rebellion in particular and intimidating anti-Putin forces in general, what did Nashi 
do—and what does it do today?  Following the 2007-2008 electoral season, some analysts 
argued that Nashi would soon disappear, its services no longer required.21  But this was a 
short-sided view.  Just as the Komsomol did not disappear after the Civil War, neither did 
                                                            
18 Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, “Young Russia Rises; the Kremlin Has a New Weapon in its War on 
Real or Imagined Enemies, From Opponents at Home to Foreign Revolutionaries,” Newsweek, May 28, 2007 
(International Edition), 0.   
19 Tony Halpin, “Youth Group ‘Keeps Order’ on Moscow Streets,” The Times (London), September 25, 2007, 
33.   
20 Michael Schwirtz, “A New Kind of Election Monitor in Russia, the Smartphone,” The New York Times, 
November 25, 2011 (Late Edition—Final), 18. 
21 See, e.g., Maya Atwal, “Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency, and Activism,” Europe-Asia 
Studies, 61, no. 5, 744, doi: 10.1080/09668130902904878.   
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Nashi dissipate after the Orange threat had faded.  Indeed, perhaps in the same way that the 
Komsomol refocused its energies on ideological power following the first Five Year Plan, as 
we saw in the last chapter, so did Nashi reorient itself toward the acquisition of ideological 
resources after the Orange threat had been effectively countered.    
     Among Nashi’s chief long-term, ideological objectives is the promulgation of a particular 
brand of nationalism.  State and nation are one in the Nashi narrative, as in other 
nationalisms, and naturally this coalesces perfectly with the “cult of the state” that Putin has 
sought to advance.22    Still, the content of Nashi’s nationalism is less than clear.  The 
organization claims to support a host of genial abstractions (“modernization, democracy, 
and patriotism,” according to Nashi front man Ivan Mostovich23), yet one is conspicuously 
hard-pressed to find concrete descriptions of what Nashi is actually for (other than Putin) 
and actually against (other than “fascism,” as we will see presently).  In general, Nashi is a 
“nationalist” organization in that it lionizes the Russian state, usually by lionizing Putin 
himself, and in that it has systematically sought to “otherize” those whom it perceives as 
unfriendly to the regime.  Certainly in so doing—in attempting to push certain unfriendly 
elements outside the perceived nation— Nashi tries not only to protect the regime from 
those who might wish it harm, but also reinforces the mythological homogeneity of the 
nation.  As one Nashi member nonchalantly explained at Lake Seliger in 2007, “The main 
thing here is to make us one family with the same ideas.”24 
     As its name manifestly suggests, Nashi is for “our” people, the Russian people, the 
people who support the president and his agenda.  In contradistinction, putative opponents 
                                                            
22 Easter, “The Russian State,” 221-224.   
23 Quoted in Finn, “Another Russian Revolution?” A17.   
24 Quoted in Tony Halpin, “Winning Young Hearts and Minds Putin’s Strategy for a New Superpower,” The 
Times (London), July 25, 2007, 29. 
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of Putin and his agenda are, in Nashi parlance, “Fascists.”  Consider, for instance, an episode 
that took place in 2007.  That year, the Bronze Soldier statue in the capital city of Tallinn, 
Estonia, a tribute to the Soviet Army, was taken out of Tallinn and moved “to a military 
cemetery.”  The event went almost entirely unnoticed in the West.  But what may have 
seemed relatively insignificant to most of us was viewed with horror in Russia.  Wasting no 
time, Russian Railways cut off oil shipments to Estonian ports, while Nashi members, yelled, 
among other things, “Fascism will not be allowed” at a press conference held by the 
Estonian ambassador in Moscow.25  Meanwhile, other Nashi members erected a sign on the 
highway between Russia and Estonia emblazoned with the words: “YOU ARE DRIVING 
TOWARD FASCIST ESTONIA.”26  The next year, in 2008, the Lake Seliger event featured 
a pig named for the Estonian president, over whose pen flew the Estonian flag.27 
     Another, earlier episode is similarly revealing.  The Brenton affair, as we might call it, 
started when Anthony Brenton, the British ambassador to Russia, met with a group of anti-
regime activists in July 2006 but neglected to meet with representatives of Nashi.  To this 
perceived insult, the group responded with celerity, undertaking a “campaign of harassment 
and intimidation” aimed squarely at Brenton.28  No surprise, then, when, in the summer of 
2008, Nashi’s then-leader noted that Brenton “supports fascists and extremists.”29  The claim 
                                                            
25 The information and the quotation come from Tony Halpin, “Russia Cuts Off Oil in Battle Over War 
Statue,” The Times (London), May 3, 2007, 40.   
26 Matthews and Nemtsova, “Young Russia Rises,” 0.     
27 Tony Halpin, “Putin’s Youth Army Gets the Summertime Blues,” The Times (London), July 22, 2008, 35.   
28 Luke Harding, “International: Kremlin: Stop Harassing UK Envoy,” The Guardian (London), January 19, 
2007 (Final Edition), 22; see also, Peter Hitchens, “The Nashis; Everywhere That the British Ambassador 
Goes, They are There, Too, Intimidating and Harassing. This is Not Hitler’s Berlin, But Moscow 2007,” 
February 4, 2007.   
29 Quoted in Harding, “G2: Welcome to Putin’s Summer Camp,” 12.   
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was senseless, but characteristic.  In Nashi-speak, “Fascist” is a pre-loaded label for 
opponents—even putative opponents—of the state. 
     Of course, far from an odd throwback to a bygone era, Nashi’s infatuation with 
“fascism” is pure nationalist mimesis.30  The constant invocation of the fascist whipping-
boy—almost seven decades after the collapse of the Third Reich—constitutes a concerted 
(and transparent) attempt to gin up nationalist pride on the coattails of the Great Patriotic 
War.  Soviet state-nationalism made great and adroit use of War memories in the second half 
of the twentieth century—not least, as we have seen, to promote the Komsomol.31  Nashi’s 
use of the “fascist” epithet is manifestly an attempt to appropriate one of the key elements 
of Soviet nationalism.  Below, we will suggest one reason that such selective appropriation 
seems to provide, and may continue to provide, the mainstay of post-Soviet nationalism in 
Russia.  In any case, as we have seen throughout this study, the rhetoric and tactics 
employed by authoritarian youth groups to advance nationalist sentiments tend to reflect the 
narratives and symbols that states wish to promote in general.  Putin, meanwhile, is the 
messianic leader in the Nashi narrative, as in contemporary Russian nationalism generally.  
As Boris Yakemenko, the brother of Nashi’s first leader, Vasili Yakemenko, put it in 2005:  
“Many enemies are gathering inside and outside Russia.  That’s why we should help Putin.”32  
     One of the most revealing examples of Nashi’s nationalist-statist-Putinist agenda is a 
scene from the propaganda film “Lessons in Courage,” showed by Nashi members to 
                                                            
30 For brief comments on this, see, e.g., Nick Paton Walsh, “Russian Youth Group Vows to Name Fascists in 
Schools: Kremlin Backs Activists in Attempt to Harness Anger,” The Guardian (London), April 27, 2005 (Final 
Edition), 18.   
31 See, on the use of war memories generally, Easter, “The Russian State,” 204, and, on the Komsomol 
connection, Merle Fainsod, “The Komsomols—A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship,” The American Political 
Science Review 45, no. 1 (March 1951): 26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950882.   
32 Quoted in Evans, “How Putin Youth is Indoctrinated,” 28. 
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schoolchildren in 2007.  The scene portrays Putin as “a lonely wolf surrounded by rats,” as 
Commissar Nikolai Panchenko described it.33  Clearly enough, Putin’s role in the metaphor is 
dual:  he is at once himself, the beleaguered leader who could get his job done if only the 
“rats” would let him, and he is Russia, a great country (noble if still fearsome, like a wolf) 
surrounded by parasites.  No doubt these parasites can be interpreted as problematic actors 
at home (one report noted that they stood for “corrupt government bureaucrats”34), as well 
as certain of the smaller countries surrounding Russia, such as Orange Ukraine, for example, 
or even Japan.  In 2011, Nashi announced a new campaign, this one against the Japanese, 
whose claim to the disputed Kuril Islands (or Northern Territories) has of late irked the 
Russians, who also claim them.  In an obviously provocative act, Medvedev visited one of 
the Islands late in 2010, earning the furor of the Japanese government—and the great 
support, just in time, of Nashi.35 
     The “rat” imagery is familiar to us.  Indeed, given Nashi’s obsessive anti-“fascist” 
rhetoric, it is darkly ironic that that the group steals so brazenly from the well-known Nazi 
propaganda which transformed Jews into rats in its own statist mythology, the results of 
which need not be reviewed.  Thus, although Nashi primarily promotes a sort of étatist 
nationalism, it may be testing the waters of ethnic nationalism.  One Nashi member recently 
turned to antisemitism outright.  In a typically tawdry incident, in 2009 Nashi was furious 
with one Alexander Podrabinek and his supporters for attacking the memory of their 
beloved Soviet Union.  This prompted one Nashi stooge to suggest that (in his words) “60% 
                                                            
33 Quoted in Matthews and Nemtsova, “Young Russia Rises,” 0.   
34 Ibid. 
35 RIANovosti, “Russian Youth Group to ‘Inform’ Japan about Disputed Islands,” RIANovosti, February 7, 
2011, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110207/162488687.html.  
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of those who signed a letter in support of Podrabinek have Jewish names.”36  The remark 
was obviously antisemitic and perhaps hinted at a reemerging feature of Russian nationalism.  
It should of course go without saying that antisemitism in particular, and the promotion of a 
national “other” in general, is central to the propagation of many nationalisms, in Russia as 
elsewhere.  Certainly in the old Soviet Union, members of the Komsomol were well-
acquainted with antisemitism.  To provide but one example, after the Second World War, 
the U.S.S.R. announced that it would take on something called “rootless cosmopolitanism,” 
which plainly, if not explicitly, amounted to renewed opposition to Jews.  As a result, as one 
historian notes, many Jews lost their jobs, and many Jewish Komsomolites “found 
themselves dismissed on flimsy pretexts and trumped-up charges.”37  The well-known plight 
of Soviet Jewry was not distinct from, but seems to have been partly a product of, the major 
Soviet AYG.   
     With regard to Nashi, the point is simply this:  even if the antisemitic remark was 
anomalous as far as antisemitism per se is concerned, it may still be representative of a larger 
project.  Certainly well before 2009, Nashi higher-ups were flirting with ethnonationalism.  
For example, in 2007, Nashi’s then-head, Nikita Borovikov, insisted that “ethnic” 
commonalities between Ukraine and Russia, coupled with their geographic proximity, meant 
that “Ukraine and Russia belong much more closely together than Ukraine and the US.”  
Borovikov then wondered aloud whether “one day” Russians and Ukrainians would “live in 
a single nation once again.”38  His suggestion was not hard to understand.           
                                                            
36 Quoted in “Soviet Words and Deeds; Russia,” The Economist, October 17, 2009 (U.S. Edition).  
37 Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 79; see, in general, 78-86 as well as 343. 
38 Quoted in Anselm Waldermann, “The Nashi Movement: Russian Youth and the Putin Cult,” November 2, 
2007, Spiegel Online: International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,514891-2,00.html. 
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IV. Sex and Morality 
 
     Like its various AYG analogues, including the Komsomol, Nashi aims to affect not only 
political opinions and outcomes, but also Russian morality and standards of behavior.  
Gender and (especially) sex are particularly important to Nashi.  In some instances, Nashi 
draws no distinction between political opposition and what it views as immoral sex.  At its 
Lake Seliger event in 2007, for instance, pictures were featured in which various opponents 
of Putin, such as Garry Kasparov, were depicted “as lingerie-clad prostitutes who sell out 
their country for US dollars.”39  The point was clear:  with typical heavy-handedness, 
opposition to the Russian state-nation was equated with prostitution.  Similarly, also at Lake 
Seliger, Nashi members have handed out pictures of “Kremlin critics portrayed as Nazis or 
prostitutes,” clearly in an effort to equate opponents of Putin’s government with Fascism 
and/or depraved sexual behavior.40 
     Often, however, the political ramifications of Nashi’s pronouncements on gender and sex 
are less apparent.  Reproduction is among Nashi’s chief goals, as its events at Lake Seliger 
have made clear.  In the summer of 2007, for example, campers could visit the “Love 
Oasis,” which consisted of tents “arranged in a heart-shape.”  Couples were encouraged to 
visit the Love Oasis and—what else?—procreate.  As an incredulous article in London’s 
Daily Mail noted at the time, at the camp, “sex is encouraged, and condoms are nowhere on 
sale.”  Meanwhile, women at the camp were “encouraged to hand in thongs and other 
                                                            
39 Halpin, “Winning Young Hearts and Minds,” 29. 
40 Shaun Walker, “WILD IN THE COUNTRY: PUTIN’S OPPOSITION PREPARES FOR BATTLE; It Has 
the Feel of a Festival—but Thousands are Flocking to a Camp in Khimki Forest Not to Party but to Mobilise 
[sic],” The Independent (London), June 20, 2011 (First Edition), 28. 
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skimpy underwear supposedly a cause of sterility and given more wholesome and substantial 
undergarments.” 41   
     Also on Nashi’s agenda at Lake Seliger was marriage—and lots of it.  In 2007, dozens of 
couples exchanged vows in “the ultimate expression of devotion to the motherland,” as one 
article put it.42  The encouragement of sex and marriage seem to be normal features of the 
Lake Seliger affair, and quite effective ones.  On this score, the words of a 22-year-old 
woman who got married there in 2008 are revealing.  “Nashi means patriotism for us.  That’s 
why we wanted to get married here,” she explained, apparently discerning no distinction 
between her family life, on the one hand, and her country, on the other.  Moreover, the 
woman, called Yuliya, promised that procreation would soon be in the works.  “We want 
three children because the first two are for the parents and the third is for growth of the 
country,” she said.43  Can the permanence of Nashi’s impact on Yuliya’s life, and on the life 
of her husband and the children they have presumably had, be overstated?  At least for these 
individuals, Nashi’s effect has been great. 
     Beyond urging young people to marry and procreate (though not necessarily in that 
order), Nashi has taken positions on other social matters, such as drinking and smoking.  
Nashi members have, for example, protested “shops accused of selling alcohol and tobacco 
to underage children,”44 and has prohibited drinking at its Lake Seliger camp.45  The group’s 
quarrel with drinking might be a subtle tribute to the various (and always ill-fated) Soviet 
                                                            
41 Edward Lucas, “SEX FOR THE MOTHERLAND; They’re Putin’s Hitler Youth. Millions of Young 
Russians Brainwashed at Sinister Camps Where Mass Weddings and Rampant Sex are Used to Unite them in 
Rabid Hatred of the West,” Daily Mail (London), July 28, 2007, 46. Emphasis added. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Quoted in Halpin, “Putin’s Youth Army,” 35. 
44 Tom Whipple, “Disturbing Echo of Youth Group that Lauds Putin,” The Times (London), December 9, 
2006, 7.  
45 Lucas, “SEX FOR THE MOTHERLAND,” 46; Halpin, “Winning Young Hearts and Minds,” 29. 
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campaigns against alcohol, or it might simply reflect a genuine aversion to alcohol use 
among Russia’s youngsters.  In either case, Nashi’s opposition to alcohol is clearly 
reminiscent of the Soviet-era tension between the Komsomol, on the one hand, and rebel 
youth culture, on the other.  As Juliane Fürst explains, in the 1940s and 1950s, opposition to 
officialdom was widespread among young Soviet workers, and this opposition often 
manifested itself in heavy drinking (which, in turn, was often accompanied with violence).  
For many of these individuals,  
all authority—state, factory, Party, and Komsomol—were responsible for the appalling 
living conditions prevailing in almost all factories and factory schools during and after 
the war….  The frequent brawls and mass disturbances that took place in the workers’ 
quarters represented a stubborn refusal to submit to efforts to streamline young workers’ 
identities into Komsomol cells, working brigades, and lecture circles.  Young workers 
everywhere in the Soviet Union insisted on getting drunk on pay-day, honouring [sic] 
Soviet holidays with even more alcohol, and getting into brawls and knife-fights on both 
occasions.  Reports noted the habit of young workers of showing up drunk at their 
Komsomol assembly and getting involved in fights with officials such as the warden of 
their dormitories….  It was often only a dead body which caused officials to look closer 
at life in the country’s dormitories and revealed to the central authorities the extent to 
which collective and individual violence, rather than Komsomol lectures and community 
work, characterized young workers’ life.  Alcohol and disorderly behaviour [sic] were not 
part of free time.  With the offers of the Komsomol consisting almost entirely of study 
or additional work, alcohol and disorderly behaviour had become the definition of free 
time.46 
 
Clearly, then, by firmly opposing alcohol use, Nashi is, not surprisingly, carrying on the 
Komsomol convention.  What is interesting is that in so doing, Nashi also seems to be 
driving a wedge between itself, on one side, and ordinary Russian youth, on the other, just as 
the VLKSM did in the Soviet era.  Clearly, over time, this could sap Nashi’s influence.        
 
 
 
 
                                                            
46 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 184-185; see also 327.  
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V. Toward a New Elite 
 
     In 2005, the then-head of Nashi, Vasili Yakemenko, explained how that year’s Lake 
Seliger camp was funded.  “We ask” businesspeople “to support the creation of a new 
political and managerial elite for the country,” he said.  “If they refuse, it’s considered 
unpatriotic.”47  In that brief statement, Yakemenko not only began to offer some indication 
of Nashi’s tactics, but also, and far more importantly, disclosed one of Nashi’s most 
important goals, i.e., the cultivation of a new nomenklatura.  Like AYG generally, Nashi is 
intended by the Putin Kremlin to produce an elite body of state loyalists.  For their part, 
Nashi members ought to be well aware of this objective.  A reporter for the London Times in 
2007, for example, could not help but poke fun at a display at Lake Seliger that provided 
participants “the privilege of choosing where they will conduct their national service.”  Not 
surprisingly, Nashisti were “encouraged” to choose the armed forces.48 
     In pursuit of this elite-formation objective, and no doubt also in order to attract young 
Russians to the organization, Nashi members are invited to attend “various schools of 
management,” where they pay no tuition, and some even intern at state-run firms like 
Gazprom and Rosneft.49  Here again, the Komsomol parallel could hardly be clearer.  As we 
started to see in the previous chapter, the Komsomol offered its members great career 
advantages and, in so doing, sought to attract to its ranks the most ambitious Soviet subjects.  
As Fainsod suggested, already in 1951, among the most effective of the Soviet state’s tools 
was its “power…to control the career expectancies of youth, to reward achievement which 
fits in with the goals of the leadership, and to punish deviant conduct with the most severe 
                                                            
47 Quoted in Evans, “How Putin Youth is Indoctrinated,” 28. 
48 Halpin, “Winning Young Hearts and Minds,” 29. 
49 Matthews and Nemtsova, “Young Russia Rises,” 0; see also Halpin, “Winning Young Hearts and Minds,” 29.   
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punishments.”50  In Nashi’s case, there are several examples of individuals transitioning from 
Nashi into official positions of power.51  Maybe most notably, Yakamenko, the first head of 
Nashi, went on to hold the top position at the State Committee on Youth Affairs.52 
     To be sure, Nashi has acquired neither the hegemony of the VLKSM nor the reach, nor 
does it seem to have sought that degree of power.  But clearly it means to play upon the 
ambitions of young people, precisely as its Communist antecedent did.  Indeed, it may be 
worth asking whether, to the extent that Nashi members constitute at least a part of the state 
“vanguard,” these young people constitute a sort of “surrogate proletariat”53 (to borrow a 
phrase from another context) for post-Soviet Russia.  As for Nashi members themselves, at 
least some of them seem to be well aware of their vanguard role.  As Commissar Nikolai 
Panchenko put it to a group of Russian schoolchildren:  “Russia has become too corrupt—it 
is time to change things, time for stronger leaders, like us.”54 
VI. Conclusions 
 
     Even before assuming the presidency, Putin admitted that he stood, in his words, for 
“strong state power.”55  As a result, during his tenure, Putin undertook to increase 
                                                            
50 Fainsod goes on, 
The system of incentives offers the highest prizes to those who manage to incorporate themselves 
into the leadership stratum of Party, secret police, army, and administration; it provides attractive 
emoluments for the intellectuals who are willing to sing the tunes of the regime; and it gives special 
bonuses to the managers, the engineers, and the shock brigadiers who distinguish themselves in 
production.  It buttresses financial awards with a system of honorifics designed to be particularly 
attractive to the less sophisticated. 
Fainsod, “The Komsomols,” 39. See also Matthews and Nemtsova, “Young Russia Rises,” 0.  
51 Atwal, “Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability,” 749 and 752. 
52 Ibid., 749n16. 
53 I borrow the phrase from Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies 
in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).   
54 Quoted in Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, “Putin’s Shock Forces; Young Militants Provide New 
Muscle for the Kremlin,” Newsweek, May 28, 2007 (U.S. Edition), 38. 
55 Quoted in Easter, “The Russian State,” 199.   
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dramatically the state’s coercive resources and to contain private capital.56  Nashi, which 
emerged in 2005, was but another manifestation of Putin’s power agenda, but in this case, 
acquiring ideological power was the primary goal.  Initially, as we have seen, Nashi was 
meant to be a counterrevolutionary force, a bulwark against the sort of uprisings which, by 
the middle-2000s, were exploding across the post-Communist landscape.  Certainly Nashi 
still counts counterrevolution among its objectives, although the sort of counterrevolution it 
supports requires some qualification.  In practice, for Nashi, counterrevolution is likely also 
counter-democratic; the group clearly has little interest in any democratic process which 
would alter the status quo, and indeed its members seem not to trust democracy.  As a 
Duma member and former Nashi bigwig, Robert Schlegel, scoffed recently:  “Only 20 years 
ago we had a totalitarian regime in Russia.  If we let people decide who they want to rule 
them, the majority would choose Stalin.”57   
     But beyond preventing an Orange uprising and seeking to affect electoral outcomes, 
Nashi has other objectives, and today it is clear that currying ideological power among young 
people is chief among them.  On this score, Putin and Nashi’s puppet masters in the 
Kremlin seem to have learned a great deal from the Soviet-era Komsomol.  This is hardly 
surprising; as Juliane Fürst points out, “[m]ost of the brains behind Nashi lived through the 
organization of youth in Soviet times and experienced the stagnating, but still awe-inspiring 
force of the Komsomol at first hand.”58  What remains to be seen is the extent to which 
Nashi is merely a post-Soviet iteration of the Komsomol, and to what extent, by contrast, its 
                                                            
56 See especially ibid., 214-215.   
57 Quoted in Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, “Back to the U.S.S.R.; Vladimir Putin’s Intention to Return 
to the Kremlin Has Opposition Critics Warning that the Country is Reverting to Soviet Times. But is That 
What Russia Secretly Wants?” Newsweek, October 27, 2011 (International Edition), 0. 
58 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 364; see in general 364-365. 
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planners seem to have learned from, and sought to avoid, the Komsomol’s mistakes.  The 
question is worth some consideration. 
      In addition to the career enhancement formerly offered by the Komsomol and today 
offered by Nashi, we have seen some degree of similarity between the two organizations in 
terms of rhetoric.  In particular, Nashi seems to have had no trouble appropriating key 
elements of postwar Soviet nationalism.  Thus, for example, Nashi could respond to the 
removal of the Bronze Soldier statue in Tallinn with what was presumably genuine 
indignation.  Never mind that the Soviet Army, to which the statue paid tribute, no longer 
exists; for Nashi, even in the middle-2000s, tampering with a symbol of Soviet war prowess, 
and of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, easily constituted an affront.  Perhaps we could 
have foreseen this.  Unable to legitimate their rule on the basis of the Revolution of 1917 in 
particular and Marxism-Leninism in general, today’s Russian leadership seems to have little 
choice but to construct post-Soviet nationalism on the basis of the non-Communist features 
of Soviet history.  The Soviet victory against the Nazis in the middle of the twentieth century 
clearly fits the bill.  At the same time, more broadly, the presence of the “fascist” charge in 
Nashi’s discursive arsenal is likely indicative of a wide-ranging effort by the state to stir up 
patriotism on the basis of World War II.    
     On the other hand, Nashi’s designers seem to have learned from some of the 
Komsomol’s missteps.  Most importantly, Nashi has retained its elite status by maintaining a 
(relatively) small membership.  The reader will remember from the previous chapter that the 
elitist nature of the VLKSM was attenuated in the middle-1930s, quite by design, and that 
the Chinese Communist Youth League would take similar steps only a few years after the 
Chinese Communists came to power in 1949.  Both organizations sought to increase 
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membership numbers, opting, as we saw, for quantity over quality.  Nashi, at least so far, has 
maintained a commitment to quality.  True, it offers great incentives to join its ranks, but it 
does not appear that Nashi is trying to cast its net nearly as wide as its Communist analogues 
have.  Nashi’s place in Russian life is surely much less prominent than was the Komsomol’s 
place in Soviet life, especially after the 1936 reforms.  But this may prove beneficial to Nashi 
in the long term if it means that its members will be devoted and motivated.       
     What, then, are Nashi’s prospects?  Nashi’s future is far from certain.  It may be telling 
that Vladislav Y. Surkov, who more or less invented Nashi in the middle-2000s, was recently 
removed from Putin’s inner-circle.  Surkov’s departure has led some to wonder if Nashi 
“could be living on borrowed time.”59  But it is unlikely in any case that Moscow will cease 
its efforts to gain ideological power among young Russians.  “If Nashi is closed down,” one 
London paper euphemistically suggests, “it cannot be assumed that the Kremlin will stop 
nurturing young activists.”60  This is surely right.  This chapter and those preceding it 
demonstrate beyond question that authoritarian states expend great efforts in pursuit of 
ideological power vis-à-vis their young subjects.  In post-Soviet Russia, Nashi emerged and 
has endured in order not only to curb potential youth uprisings, but also, and perhaps no 
less, to bolster the infrastructural power of the central state in the aftermath of the Yel’tsin 
years.  In the immediate future, we should expect that Putin’s efforts to achieve ideological 
power at the expense of civil society (not least among youth) will correlate positively with 
parallel efforts to consolidate further the power of the Russian state—and to reduce, 
consequently, the power of private actors.   
                                                            
59 Shaun Walker, “Russian Youth Group Outlives Its Usefulness,” The Independent (London), February 16, 2012 
(First Edition), 32. 
60 Ibid. 
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Chapter V:  Conclusions 
     In A Man’s a Man, the playwright Bertolt Brecht depicts man’s tragic, but fundamental, 
pliability.  In the play, an ordinary man sets out one day intending no more than to buy a 
fish, but he is changed along the way—“transformed, nay transfigured”—into “a soldier,” 
the ultimate servant of the state and its power.1  We are frail and fungible, Brecht tells us; we 
can be molded and re-molded easily, quickly, and without warning.  Is Brecht right?  The 
architects and governors of authoritarian states seem to think so.  In the preceding pages, I 
have attempted to show that states of all sorts, but especially authoritarian states, take great 
pains to try to affect the beliefs, convictions, and values of their citizens or subjects.  They 
do so via ideological resources, for which they compete with society-level actors.  All states have 
their own motives, I have argued, and all states employ their own tools with which to 
achieve those motives, one of which is ideological power.       
     More specifically, this study has tried to show how authoritarian states try to affect 
children and young adults, taking advantage for their own gain of that essential human 
pliability to which Brecht points.  More often than not, officials in authoritarian states 
recognize that the success of their political program in the short term, and its perseverance 
in the long term, are largely contingent on the loyal support of youngsters, whom they try to 
coopt through various means.  One tool of cooptation is the authoritarian youth group, or 
AYG.  I have argued here that authoritarian states build and maintain AYG primarily in 
order to shape youngsters’ beliefs and convictions, to supply them with certain values, and to 
deprive them of others.  In so doing, states aim increase their infrastructural power.  As 
                                                            
1 Bertolt Brecht, A Man’s a Man, in Baal, a Man’s a Man, and the Elephant Calf: Early Plays, ed. Eric Bentley (New 
York: Grove Press, Inc., 1964), 121; the play is 117-198. 
95 
 
Merle Fainsod wrote in 1951 in his study of the Soviet Komsomol:  “Each new generation as 
it grows to maturity offers Party leadership a fresh opportunity to imprint its stamp on it.  
The capacity of the totalitarian régime to mold the minds of the young while they are still 
plastic and malleable is a formidable weapon, the power of which should never be 
underrated.”2  In this short paper, I have attempted only to begin what is surely a long-
overdue conversation.  Further study of the cases examined here, as well as authoritarian 
youth groups not treated here, ought to be undertaken.  Scholars should also try to 
understand how liberal-democratic states try to acquire ideological power vis-à-vis young 
people, especially beyond the classroom. 
     To be sure, states’ efforts on this score are not always successful.  Another scholar of 
Soviet youth, Juliane Fürst, argues persuasively that, for most of its members, the 
Komsomol was ultimately an artifact of public life whose influence, although considerable, 
could be eluded in a host of ways.  Indeed, the artifactual character of the Komsomol clearly 
contributed to its terminability.  As Fürst notes, sporadic instances of genuine accord 
between the Komsomol (that is, the state) and its members failed in the end to make up for 
the fact that real youth culture happened far away from the spaces occupied by the 
authorities.  It is thus not surprising that when in 1991 the Komsomol collapsed, the 
biggest youth organization in the world seemed to crumble without leaving as much 
as a trace.  The wealth of the Komsomol vanished as mysteriously as its devoted 
members…..  The enormous superstructure that had made up the youth 
organization was broken up, its underbelly revealing just a big void.  One day the 
Komsomol existed for its members, the next they shrugged their shoulders when 
they realized they no longer had to pay membership fees….  Some were left with a 
feeling of melancholy, most just returned to their everyday lives and the youth 
cultures they had constructed for themselves.3 
 
                                                            
2 Merle Fainsod, “The Komsomols—A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship,” The American Political Science Review 
45, no. 1 (March 1951): 27-28, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950882.   
3 Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 363. 
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Nevertheless, the Komsomol lasted for nearly a century in a state whose victory in the 
Second World War gave it, as Fürst writes, “a second lifeline.”4  How the Hitler Jugend, by 
contrast, would have fared had the tables been turned and the Third Reich been victorious is 
of course not knowable.   
     On the basis of the Komsomol’s example, Fürst predicts that Nashi, to which we turned 
in the previous chapter, will fail similarly.  “At the moment Nashi is cool—but there is a 
good chance it will be only lukewarm in a generation’s time,” she argues, perhaps correctly.5  
Still, it may be revealing that, as we have seen, Nashi seems to have learned a great deal from 
its Soviet-era analogue and may, as a result, avoid some of its mistakes.  At least for now, 
Nashi’s elite character and small membership, which clearly recalls the early days of the 
Komsomol, as well as the Communist Youth League in China, may point to the future of 
the authoritarian youth group.  Alternatively, if Fürst is right, a new model may arise, though 
whether it will come first to Russia is not easy to know.  What is certain is that states of all 
sorts will continue to seek ideological power among their citizens or subjects, and especially 
among young people.  States may not always succeed, but they will always try.  As for Nashi, 
while it has certainly faced its detractors, no society-level association seems poised even to 
serve as a counterweight to it, much less to question its supremacy.  As I concluded in the 
previous chapter, continuing efforts by Putin’s government in today’s Russian Federation to 
amass ideological resources will likely happen alongside other measures intended to increase 
the power of the central state relative to society.  
                                                            
4 Ibid., 137. 
5 Ibid., 365. 
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     Ultimately, Brecht’s claim in A Man’s a Man may be simplistic.  Perhaps we are not always 
as mutable as he implies.  Fürst demonstrates that even the house that Stalin built was 
bedeviled by certain edificial flaws.  Especially after the Second World War, cracks in the 
walls and rifts in the foundation began to appear as young Soviets increasingly found ways, 
albeit often small ways, to resist the state.  Even the Hitler Youth failed to achieve total 
membership.6  But state efforts to achieve ideological power endured nevertheless, in these 
cases and in others.  The man (or the child) who steps outside one day to buy a fish still has 
cause to beware, especially where state power dwarfs that of societal counterforces.     
 
                                                            
6 Michael Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 27. 
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